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BEYOND METAPHOR: AN ANALYSIS OF
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
DEBORAH A. DEMoTr*
Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-
American law. Applicable in a variety of contexts, and apparently devel-
oped through a jurisprudence of analogy rather than principle, the fiduci-
ary constraint on a party's discretion to pursue self-interest resists tidy
categorization. Although one can identify common core principles of fi-
duciary obligation, these principles apply with greater or lesser force in
different contexts involving different types of parties and relationships.
Recognition that the law of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific
should be the starting point for any further analysis.
Because of the wide range of situations in which the obligation may
arise, the law of fiduciary obligation has developed through analogy to
contexts in which the obligation conventionally applies. Judicial opin-
ions in this well-established tradition first identify paradigm cases in
which fiduciary obligation applies and then examine whether the rela-
tionship involved in the litigation is sufficiently like those in the paradigrh
cases to support an extension of the obligation to that relationship.'
Courts also resort to analogy in order to determine the rules applicable to
a fiduciary in a particular situation. 2 Additionally, if an agreement de-
fines the parties' relationship to any extent, the court must consider the
impact of the agreement's terms on the applicable fiduciary norms. The
difficulty of this task should not be underestimated.
In attempting to define the parameters of fiduciary obligation in the
corporate context, courts and commentators have sometimes drawn on
contract-law principles as one particular mode of analogy. While con-
tract-law principles may be helpful in illuminating some of the distinctive
characteristics of fiduciary obligation, when these principles are applied
analytically to resolve questions of fiduciary obligation, they inevitably
make only a limited contribution. Resorting unreflectively to contract
rhetoric is insidiously misleading and provides no rationale for further
* Professor of Law, Duke University. I am grateful to my colleagues Stanley Fish and John
Weistart for their comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. See, e-g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 466-67, 164 N.E. 545, 547-48 (1928) (coad-
venturers' duties analogous to those of partners).
2. See, eg., In re Estate of Swiecicki, 106 Ill. 2d 111, 117-18, 477 N.E.2d 488, 490 (1985)
(relation of guardian and ward analogous to that of trustee and beneficiary).
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development of the law of fiduciary obligation. My thesis is that, even
considering the obligation's elusive nature, descriptions drawn exclu-
sively from contract principles are surely mistaken.
Indeed, one of the descriptions of fiduciary obligation criticized in
this Article reflects a mistaken metaphorical use of technical legal
terms-a mistaken equation of fiduciary obligation with aspects of con-
tract law.a A review of the general principles of fiduciary obligation
prefaces the demonstration that this equation is erroneous. The Article
then examines the features of contract law that seem closest in function
to the fiduciary obligation. It next reviews theoretical attempts to state a
general justification for fiduciary obligation or to provide a general expla-
nation of the obligation, and concludes with an examination of a few
current issues in corporate law to which these theoretical disputes are
relevant.
I. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION AS JUDICIAL GUESS
A. Historical Background.
The historical development of the law of fiduciary obligation is cru-
cial to an understanding of its elusiveness. As a legal principle, the obli-
gation originated in Equity. Equity granted relief-and common law
courts did not-in numerous situations involving one person's abuse of
confidence reposed in him by another.4 As Equity evolved, concrete
rules in many instances supplanted the chancellors' exercise of discretion
based on broad principles; established usages for terms like "trust" and
"confidence" replaced an earlier and imprecise vocabulary.5 The term
"fiduciary" itself was adopted to apply to situations falling short of
"trusts," but in which one person was nonetheless obliged to act like a
trustee.6
Not surprisingly, the corporate form of business organization
proved to be fertile ground for application and development of fiduciary
principles. A corporation's directors occupy a trustee-like position: un-
like trustees, directors do not themselves have legal ownership interests
in transferable property beneficially owned by others, but, like trustees,
3. A metaphor, as a figure of speech, treats two dissimilar things as identical in order to call
attention to their similarities. L. LEMON, A GLOSSARY FOR THE STUDY OF ENGLISH 72 (1971).
Using a technical legal term metaphorically is problematic when the connotations of the metaphori-
cal use are at odds with the conclusions one would reach through analytic application of the relevant
legal concept. For example, referring to a transaction as "fraudulent" when key elements of any
relevant statutory or common law definition of "fraud" are missing is, in a technical context, a
dubious metaphorical usage. See infra text accompanying notes 43-51.
4. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69-70.
5. Id. at 70-71.
6. Id. at 71-72.
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directors are entrusted with powers to use in the interest of others. In-
vested by corporation statutes with discretionary authority to manage or
supervise the management of the corporation's business, directors are
bound by fiduciary principles.
The evolution of fiduciary obligation thus owed much to the situa-
tion-specificity and flexibility that were Equity's hallmarks. Moreover,
as Equity developed to correct and supplement the common law,7 the
interstitial nature of Equity's doctrines and functions made these doc-
trines and functions resistant to precise definition. In the corporate con-
text in the United States, the continued evolution of fiduciary norms was
shaped significantly by the institutional fact that the most prominent cor-
porate law court-Delaware's Chancery Court-was (and still is) a sepa-
rate court of equity,8 operating with a self-consciously equitable style.9
As a result of this history, the development of the adjective law1O of fidu-
7. See R. DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 342 (3d ed. 1985).
8. Unlike most jurisdictions in the United States, Delaware has never merged law and equity.
See D. LUNT, TALES OF THE DELAWARE BENCH AND BAR 194 (1963). See generally F. JAMES &
G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.6 (3d ed. 1985) (describing elimination of parallel court systems
and merger of law and equity).
9. This proposition, widely accepted as true by Delaware practitioners, is amenable to less
anecdotal support as well. The court is called the "Court of Chancery" and its judges the "Chancel-
lor" and "Vice-Chancellors." The court has jurisdiction over traditionally "equitable" matters, such
as trusts and guardianship proceedings, as well as all actions in which the plaintiff seeks an equitable
remedy. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1975). If the parties have sufficient remedies before
any other court, Chancery "shall not have" jurisdiction to determine the matter. Id. § 342.
That Chancery is a court of equity is also manifest in its relationship with the Delaware
Supreme Court. It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to promulgate in opinions what appear to
be firm rules of black letter law, but to couple these rules with express acknowledgments of Chan-
cery's power to vary their application under the circumstances of a particular case. See, e.g., Aron-
son v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984) (acknowledging Chancery's discretionary review in
determining excuse of demand requirement in shareholder derivative actions). As a result, although
a rule itself may not be explicitly discretionary, discretion in interpretation and enforcement arises
from the institutional fact that Chancery is a court of equity.
The perceived quality of Delaware's Chancery Court as a forum for corporate litigation pro-
vides a conventional justification for Delaware's attractiveness as a situs for incorporation. This fact
might well cause one to question the wisdom of abolishing courts of equity in other jurisdictions. Or
at least one might wonder whether abolition results in losses as well as benefits.
10. That is, the rules of law and institutions that define how the substantive law is administered
are, at least with respect to fiduciary obligation, crucial to understanding its import as a substantive
body of law. One scholarly commentary on equity defines fiduciary obligation principally through
its adjective aspect: "Broadly, it may be said that a fiduciary relationship exists, giving rise to obliga-
tions of that character, where the relationship is one of confidence, in which equity imposes duties
upon the person in whom confidence is reposed in order to prevent the abuse of the confidence." R.
MEAGHER, W. GUMMOW & J. LEHANE, EQUITY: DOCTRINES & REMEDIES 123 (2d ed. 1984). See
generally Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80
Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1985) (explaining rules governing judicial review of fiduciary decisionmaking as
pragmatic accommodation of comparative difficulties with legal regulation and private ordering).
That this body of law is judge-made would explain why commentators occasionally refer to it as
a "common law" phenomenon. See, e.g., Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCI-
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ciary obligation is inseparably a part of the obligation's substantive
content.
B. General Principles.
Fiduciary obligation is not unique to corporate law. In general
terms, the law governing fiduciary obligation addresses two questions:
First, in what circumstances does fiduciary obligation apply? Second,
what does the obligation require a person to do? If a person in a particu-
lar relationship with another is subject to a fiduciary obligation, that per-
son (the fiduciary) must be loyal to the interests of the other person (the
beneficiary). The fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty;
they oblige him to act to further the beneficiary's best interests. The fidu-
ciary must avoid acts that put his interests in conflict with the benefici-
ary's. For example, if the fiduciary contracts with the beneficiary, the
contract is voidable by the beneficiary unless the fiduciary has disclosed
his interests adequately under the circumstances."1 If the fiduciary bene-
fits through acts inconsistent with his obligation of fidelity, the benefici-
ary can recover any benefit realized by the fiduciary unless he consents to
the fiduciary's retention of it. 12 In transactions between the fiduciary and
the beneficiary, therefore, the fiduciary must be candid and must evince
utmost good faith.13
To be sure, the ramifications of these basic principles are complex,
as may be the determination whether, in a particular relationship, a fidu-
ciary obligation exists in the first place. Only confusion will result if a
court grounds its approach in a mistaken conception of fiduciary obliga-
tion. A recent Seventh Circuit case, Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 14 pro-
vides a vivid illustration. Jordan addresses this relatively simple
question: How candid must a fiduciary be in his dealings with a benefici-
ary? More narrowly stated, the issue in Jordan is whether a closely held
corporation breaches its fiduciary obligation to an employee-shareholder
by neglecting to disclose, when it repurchases his shares, that negotia-
tions that might lead to a merger between the corporation and another
entity are underway.
PALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 76 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1986)
(fiduciary rules "created by judges in the common law tradition"). Few areas of the law are as
distinctively equitable in character as fiduciary obligation, and few owe so little of their origin or
subsequent development to the common law.
11. Sealy, Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligation, 1963 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 119, 125-26.
12. Id. at 128.
13. See P. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 4 (1977).
14. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988).
[Vol. 1988:879
Vol. 1988:879] FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
C. The Jordan Definition of Fiduciary Obligation.
The employee-shareholder in Jordan had no express employment
contract with the company and was thus an employee at will. Like all
the company's employees, as a condition of purchasing his shares he
signed an agreement providing that, upon the termination of his employ-
ment for any reason, he or his estate "shall sell" his shares to the corpo-
ration, which "shall buy.., all [s]hares of the [c]orporation then owned
by" the employee or his estate, at a price equal to the shares' book value
"on the December 31 which coincides with, or immediately precedes, the
date of termination."' 5 The written agreement did not address the em-
ployer's-or for that matter the employee's' 6-obligation to share infor-
mation with the other party at the point of termination. As it happened,
the plaintiff's employment ended because he wished, for family reasons,
to move to another city. The plaintiff agreed with his employer to work
for the remainder of the year, which enabled him to receive the stock's
book value as of the end of that year.' 7
The majority opinion in Jordan characterizes the relationship be-
tween the employee-shareholder and the employer-corporation as one
that imposes a fiduciary obligation on the corporation to disclose mate-
rial facts to shareholders when purchasing their shares. Even if the
"fact" at issue were one that a public corporation could justifiably with-
hold from its shareholders and the securities markets generally,' 8 a
15. Id. at 432.
16. One significant type of information in this context is the employee's knowledge of circum-
stances, not known to the employer, that would constitute cause for termination even if the employee
were not an employee at will. Suppose the employer does not ask the employee whether any such
circumstances are known to him. After the employer discovers the existence of such circumstances,
should the employer be entitled to recover any amounts it has paid to the employee in exchange for
cancellation of the employee's contract rights?
In Bell v. Lever Bros., 1932 App. Cas. 161 (P.C.), the former employer sought restitution of
amounts it paid under such circumstances, arguing that had it known at the time of termination that
its two employees had breached their fiduciary duty, it would not have paid them £50,000 to dis-
charge the unexpired terms of their contracts. Had Lever known the true state of affairs, it could
have terminated the employees for cause, without cost. The House of Lords reversed the lower
court's award of restitution, stating that the employer was not mistaken as to the "identity" of what
it bargained for and that, whether or not the employees breached their contract of employment, the
employer, having bargained for a release of its obligations under that contract, got exactly what it
bargained for. Id. at 223-26. Interestingly, the leading U.S. authority on restitution treats the analy-
sis in Bell as an obvious misapplication of mistake analysis and strongly suggests that the outcome in
a U.S. court would be different. See 2 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESIrTsTON § 12.2, at 541-43
(1978). If the subject matter of a contract is an intangible interest (as an employee's rights under an
employment contract would surely be), U.S. courts ignore the "identity" test applied in Bell and
grant restitution when the parties' agreement rests on mistaken basic assumptions. Id. at 542-43.
17. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 432.
18. See id. at 431. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988), the Court held that an
issuer's denial that merger negotiations were taking place, when the parties had not yet reached
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closely held corporation like the one in Jordan may not, consistently
with the fiduciary constraint, repurchase its shares without disclosing all
information that would be significant to a reasonable shareholder's delib-
erations.19 Even though the plaintiff was an employee at will, and even
though the prior agreement bound him to sell his shares to the corpora-
tion upon termination of his employment, his decision to leave was his;
moreover, in the majority's view, the plaintiff's relationship with his em-
ployer was so amicable that he could have timed his departure to follow
rather than precede the merger.
20
The notion that a corporation owes a fiduciary obligation to its own
shareholders poses analytic challenges of heroic dimensions, which part
IV of this Article addresses.21 The immediate focus, though, is on the
more general problems raised by the Jordan majority's description of the
nature of fiduciary obligation. The obligation is, according to the opin-
ion, "a standby or off-the-rack guess about what parties would agree to if
they dickered about the subject explicitly."22 The dissenting judge agrees
with this characterization of the obligation23 and also with the proposi-
tion that a corporation owes its shareholders a fiduciary obligation.2 4 In
his analysis, however, the employee's contractual obligation to sell the
company his stock upon termination of employment, along with his
merely "contingent" claim to employment as an employee at will, to-
gether eliminate any obligation that the corporation might otherwise
have had to disclose price-sensitive information to its departing em-
ployee. According to the dissent, treating the corporation as bound by a
fiduciary obligation to disclose information to its selling shareholder is
inconsistent with the corporation's ability, as employer, to trigger at any
time an obligation in the shareholder to sell his shares to the corporation
agreement in principle on the price and structure of the transaction, could be an actionable misstate-
ment of a material fact under SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). Absent a duty to
disclose, the issuer's silence would not be actionable because under Rule lOb-5, silence is not consid-
ered misleading. Basic Inc., 108 S. Ct. at 987 n.17. For a thoughtful discussion of the complex
issues surrounding the issuer's duty to disclose such information, see Gabaldon, The Disclosure of
Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule 10b-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1218 (1987); see also infra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
19. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 434.
20. Id. at 436 (employer permitted "employees to time their departures to obtain the maximum
advantage from their stock"). As it happened, the merger fell through. Although Jordan's employer
reached a definitive merger agreement with its merger partner, a bank holding company, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve approved the transaction subject to a condition so onerous that
the parties abandoned the merger. Id. at 433. Less than a year later, however, a trust acquired Duff
& Phelps, Jordan's employer. Id. at 441.
21. See infra notes 166-89 and accompanying text.
22. 815 F.2d at 436.
23. Id. at 446-47 (Posner, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 445.
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by terminating him as an employee. Indeed, Illinois law, which governed
the parties' employment relationship, permits an employer to terminate
an employee at will for any reason, or for no reason, unless the termina-
tion contravenes "a clearly mandated public policy."' 25 That two opin-
ions, applying the same conception of fiduciary obligation, reach opposite
conclusions on identical facts is a good reason to examine their initial
premise.
The definition of fiduciary obligation articulated in the Jordan opin-
ions appears to be literally unprecedented in prior Anglo-American
caselaw. The opinions define fiduciary obligation as the court's guess
about what the parties would have agreed to, had they bargained over the
matter. To the extent that the Jordan opinions suggest that this defini-
tion is anything other than a novel departure from prior caselaw, the
representation is not accurate.
A brief example may help illustrate the degree of estrangement be-
tween the definition of fiduciary obligation in the Jordan opinions and
prior caselaw. Consider a case in which a court held that a franchisor
owed a fiduciary obligation to its franchisee. 26 In Arnott v. American Oil
Co., for example, the court held that the franchisor was under such an
obligation and breached it by terminating the franchise.27 The parties'
contractual relationship was defined by a term lease that did not oblige
the . franchisor to renew and that contained provisions admittedly
breached by the franchisee.28 If Arnott is correct in constraining,
through a fiduciary obligation, the franchisor's discretion to terminate its
franchisee, then the assumption that this obligation is what the parties
would have agreed to had they bargained over the matter is not even
remotely plausible.
D. Contract-Law Analysis.
The "hypothetical bargain" approach, although heretofore un-
known in the law of fiduciary obligation, does call to mind aspects of
contract law, and perhaps the Jordan opinions echo these resonances.
Parties can demonstrate with their behavior that they intend to have a
contractual relationship on particular terms, even if their spoken or writ-
ten words do not elaborate all of those terms.29 For example, in certain
25. Id. at 449 (quoting Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356
(1985)).
26. See generally Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REv. 650 (1971)
(arguing that fiduciary principles should apply in franchising relationships).
27. 609 F.2d 873, 882-84 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
28. Id. at 877-79.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 4, 19 (1981).
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circumstances a promise to pay for goods or services can be inferred from
a party's conduct: if I telephone a merchant and order goods to be deliv-
ered to me, a promise to pay the merchant's current price can fairly be
inferred from my conduct.30 Contracts resulting from such circum-
stances are described as contracts "implied in fact"; their terms, if made
express, are those that the parties would surely articulate if they had
occasion to do S0.31
Contract law also recognizes and enforces implied-in-fact conditions
to agreements. As with express conditions, the fulfillment of implied-in-
fact conditions determines whether performance is due, unless nonfulfill-
ment of the condition is excused. 32 The parties' manifest intention con-
trols the implication of implied-in-fact conditions, 33 as it does with
implied-in-fact contracts.
The "hypothetical bargain" approach may also assist a court in allo-
cating the burden of contract risks not explicitly addressed by the parties'
agreement, and particularly in determining whether occurrence of a par-
ticular risk should excuse nonperformance. 34 Finally, if the transaction
is a sale of goods, article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code supple-
ments the terms of the parties' express agreement with standardized "gap
filler" terms, provided that the parties' conduct is sufficient to show an
intention to make a contract and that the court has a "reasonably cer-
tain" basis on which to fashion a remedy.35
30. Id. § 4 comment a, illustration 1.
31. E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACrS § 3.15, at 142 n.2 (1982). In contrast, the term "quasi-
contract" conventionally applies only to claims for redress of unjust enrichment. Id. § 2.20. It is
important not to confuse quasi-contract with the distinctly different concept of implied-in-fact con-
tract. Id. § 3.14, at 142 n.2, § 2.20, at 99 n.3. In many "quasi-contracts," the parties do not intend
to have a contractual relationship. See id. § 2.20, at 99 n.3. The opinions in Jordan clearly do not
address issues pertinent to quasi-contractual liability. But cf Weiss & White, Of Econometrics and
Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REv.
551, 594 n.188 (1987) (characterizing as "quasi-contractual" the hypothetical bargain view of corpo-
rate law).
32. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 8.3, at 544.
33. See id. § 8.2, at 539 & n.13.
34. Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863), is the leading case in the academic canon of
contract cases taking the hypothetical bargain approach to risk allocation. The defendant in Taylor
agreed to license the plaintiff to use a particular music hall on specified dates for specified entertain-
ment extravaganzas. The parties' written agreement contained no provision dealing with the possi-
bility that the music hall might be destroyed prior to the specified dates without fault of either party,
as it was. The licensee sued to recover the expenses it incurred in preparation for the concerts. The
court held that the parties' contract should be understood to include an implied condition excusing
nonperformance after destruction of the music hall, "because from the nature of the contract it is
apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of [the hall's] continued existence." Id. at 314. The
court implied the condition because it fulfilled "the intention of those who entered into the contract.
For in the course of affairs men in making such contracts in general would, if it were brought to their
minds, say that there should be such a condition." Id at 312.
35. U.C.C. § 2-204(1), (3) (1978).
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In any event, these contract law doctrines operate so differently
from fiduciary obligation that to invoke them, even vaguely, in contexts
like Jordan only confuses the analysis. For starters, these creatures of
contract law are controlled by the parties' manifest intention; fiduciary
obligation sometimes operates precisely in opposition to intention as
manifest in express agreements. The terms of an express agreement are
surely not irrelevant to the fiduciary obligation analysis, but once a court
concludes that a particular relationship has a fiduciary character, the
parties' manifest intention does not control their obligations to each
other as dispositively as it does under a contract analysis.
The Jordan opinions appear oblivious to the basic point that a fidu-
ciary obligation may operate independently of the legal consequences of
the parties' express agreement, however comprehensive the agreement
may be. Consider a partnership in which one of the partners, having
fallen out with her fellow partners, wishes to dissolve the partnership.
The Uniform Partnership Act, like the common law, enables that partner
to dissolve the partnership at will, and at any time.36 The partnership
agreement may itself contain provisions dealing with dissolution. But
even if the partner's dissolution at will does not breach the partnership
agreement, all partners remain accountable to the partnership as fiducia-
ries and must account to it "for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any
profits derived by [individual partners] without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by [individual partners] of
its property. '37 In short, having the right to terminate a relationship
does not establish the absence of fiduciary constraints on transactions
connected with the termination. From this perspective, the employer's
ability in Jordan to terminate the plaintiff's employment and thereby
oblige him to sell his shares to the corporation is irrelevant to the em-
ployer's obligation, as fiduciary, to disclose information to the selling
shareholder.
Arnott again provides a contrast to Jordan. To the extent that par-
ties' manifest intention can be inferred from the express terms of their
written agreement, the parties in Arnott apparently did not intend to
limit the franchisor's discretion in determining whether to renew the
franchise. Thus, either the fiduciary restraint on the franchisor's ability
to terminate is inconsistent with the parties' intention to the extent that
such intention can be inferred from the express terms of their agreement,
or the Arnott analysis requires an overly attenuated definition of
36. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(2) (1969).




Another profound dissimilarity between contract and fiduciary anal-
ysis is the remedy available if the obligation is breached. If fiduciary
obligation were as the Jordan opinions characterize it, one would expect
the outcomes and remedies in many different cases to change. When a
party breaches an implied-in-fact contract (or an express contract for
that matter), and is sued for money damages, the plaintiffs recovery
should quantify the advantage lost as a result of the defendant's nonper-
formance. The general goal of contract damages, in short, is to compen-
sate the plaintiff for loss of an expected advantage.39 The law of fiduciary
obligation calculates damages from a very different perspective. That
perspective dictates that the plaintiff is entitled to recover specific restitu-
tion of any benefit that the defendant obtained through his breach or, if
specific restitution is not feasible, money damages that quantify the de-
fendant's benefit.40 Even if the fiduciary's actions have not injured the
beneficiary, and even if the beneficiary has in some sense gained as a
result of the fiduciary's act, the fiduciary must account to the beneficiary
for its profits.4' More aggressive remedies to restore the benefit, such as
equitable tracing or accounting and the imposition of a constructive
trust, may also be available. 42 The key technical deficiency of the Jordan
definition of fiduciary obligation is thus its failure to correspond in basic
respects to the existing caselaw. Further, as applied in the case itself, the
Jordan definition of fiduciary obligation leads to obvious indeterminacy.
E. Metaphorical Use of Technical Legal Terms.
These deficiencies in Jordan's treatment of fiduciary obligation illus-
trate, among other things, the difficulty inherent in metaphorical uses of
technical language. Contract law is a richly textured body of law whose
constructs cannot simply be transported into other legal contexts. 43
Even if one could accurately characterize as a "standardized contract"
the body of statutory law governing corporate formation, thus treating
38. Along these lines, judges writing in the Commonwealth tradition stress the importance of
ascertaining the "true construction" of the contract, so that fiduciary obligation superimposed upon
the express and implied terms of the contract will not alter the operation the parties intended their
agreement to have. See Hospital Prods. Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp., 55 A.L.R. 417, 455
(Austl. 1984) (Mason, J.).
39. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 12.8, at 839.
40. See G. PALMER, supra note 16, § 2.11, at 141-42.
41. See, e.g., In re Estate of Swiecicki, 106 IUl. 2d 111, 119, 477 N.E.2d 488, 491 (1985) (minor
entitled to investment profits that guardian bank acquired in violation of fiduciary relationship).
42. See G. PALMER, supra note 16, § 2.11, at 142-43.
43. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 434-44, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-50 (1988) (surrogate
parenting agreement). See generally The Baby M Contract: Is it Enforceable?, N.JL.J., Feb. 26,
1987, at I.
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that formation under a particular statute as an approximation of "what
the parties would have agreed to," 44 caselaw prior to Jordan does not
support extending this characterization to the body of judge-made law
defining fiduciary obligation. True, some academic commentators-al-
ways without resort to case support-so characterize it,45 but they ap-
pear, at least in this respect, to be traveling light as legal theorists. That
is, if the claim being made is descriptive, it is mistaken. Hf on the other
hand, the claim is normative, its normative character should be expressly
acknowledged. Although judicial imposition of fiduciary obligation may
reduce the necessity for parties to draft detailed contract provisions regu-
lating the fiduciary's permissible uses of discretion, 46 that result obvi-
ously does not establish that the fiduciary obligation is-or even
resembles-an implied-in-fact contract. Thus, the rhetorical and ideo-
logical appeal of contract law should be distinguished from its analytic
aptness in various legal contexts.
Even divorced from the operation of contract-law doctrines, the
"hypothetical bargain" view of fiduciary obligation does not help to ex-
plain the law. For one thing, how hypothetical is the bargain? If it is an
approximation of something that particular parties would have agreed to,
the content of the bargain will, like actual bargains, reflect many factors,
44. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 369-72 (3d ed. 1986). One difficulty, as
Posner's text acknowledges, is determining who counts as "a party" for purposes of reconstructing
the hypothetical agreement. For example, it is not likely that all of a corporation's creditors would,
if given the opportunity, assent to the shareholders' limited liability for corporate debts. Judge Pos-
ner mentions the case of the "involuntary" provider of credit, such as a victim of an accidental tort,
as a point where "[tihe contract analogy breaks down." Id. at 372. Additionally, the historical
development of corporate law in the United States suggests that the "gtandardized contract" charac-
terization is more metaphorical than descriptive; until the early 1800s, private and municipal corpo-
rations were not substantially differentiated in legal treatment. See Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, the
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv.
919, 939 & n.42 (1988).
45. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702
(1982); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1264 (1982). Other
commentators have correctly observed that this characterization of fiduciary duty cannot be sus-
tained. See, e.g., Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1407 n.15 (1985) (characterizing as "fanciful" the treatment of fiduciary
constraint as hypothetical result of parties' bargain); Clark, supra note 10, at 68 (observing that
"implicit-contracts" approach is "frequently indeterminate and therefore manipulable"); Farrar,
Ownership and Control of Listed Public Companies-Revising or Rejecting the Concept of Control, in
COMPANY LAW IN CHANGE 61 (B. Pettet ed. 1987) ("substitution of the more naive concepts of
contract and agency for the sophistication of the existing legal concepts of corporation and fiduci-
ary" is inappropriate); Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles
of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 325, 348 (1987) (nexus-of-contracts and
agency-costs approaches better seen as "crude generalizations or metaphors than as theories nor-
mally employed in legal analysis").
46. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 738, 760 (1978).
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including the scarcity of the subject matter of the bargain, the parties'
relative skills in negotiation, and their relative degrees of aversion to risks
of varied sorts. In the absence of an actual bargain, one cannot know the
import of each of these factors. On the other hand, if the "hypothetical
bargain" represented by fiduciary obligation is truly hypothetical, and
not an approximation of what particular parties would have agreed to,
why characterize it as a "bargain" at all? In this respect, the metaphor of
the hypothetical bargain is like the Wizard of Oz. Behind the curtain is
less than appearances might suggest.
Metaphor, when effectively used, is a powerful rhetorical device be-
cause it engages the reader's attention and imagination in ways that more
literal uses of language do not. Metaphors, by requiring collaboration
between the author and the reader, are like enigmas, riddles,47 and even
jokes.48 Metaphors compel the reader to notice similarities between su-
perficially dissimilar things, usually by asserting that they are identical.
Even metaphors that are literally true, like "no man is an island," have
this effect. But communicating one's thoughts through metaphor is inev-
itably an indirect process, 49 one that draws on the perspective of particu-
lar readers and requires an audience of readers who possess considerable
information about the writer's beliefs and background. The "metaphori-
cal truth" that a metaphor conveys, even if it is indeed true, thus tends to
vary somewhat with each individual reader.
These characteristics of metaphor suggest two basic points about its
use in legal contexts. First, although in some legal contexts the use of
metaphorical language seems entirely appropriate, in others it seems just
as entirely peculiar. One would not, for example, be surprised by meta-
phorical and other figurative uses of language in an advocate's argument
to a jury, but surely one would be startled by the use of a metaphor in a
statute or an indictment. "All taxpayers should bleed equally," as a pro-
vision in a tax code, or "the defendant is a shark," as a count in an
indictment, are statements that would appear inappropriate, perhaps dis-
concertingly so, in those contexts. Too much of the statements' meaning
turns on individual readers' emotive responses to "blood" and "sharks,"
in contexts where more rather than less precision in meaning is evidently
47. See Booth, Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation, in ON METAPHOR 47, 63 (S.
Sacks ed. 1979).
48. See Cohen, Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy, in ON METAPHOR, supra note 47, at
1, 8,
49. Some literary critics treat even metaphors in poetry as suspect, but nonetheless essential.
Along these lines, I.A. Richards wrote, "There are few metaphors whose effect, if carefully ex-
amined, can be traced to the logical relations involved. Metaphor is a semi-surreptitious method by
which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of the [poetic] experience." I.A.
RICHARDS, PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITIcIsM 240 (1924).
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desirable. Second, the metaphorical use of technical legal terms, like
"contract" or "agency" or "fraudulent," has even less to commend it in
legal contexts where the potential for confusion is so great. Even if we
were persuaded by philosophical arguments that, at some level, all lan-
guage is rooted in metaphorical origins, ultimately traceable to essential
equations between verbal symbols and nonverbal phenomena, 50 we
should still be disinclined to excuse the metaphoric use of technical terms
in workaday contexts like law. As C.S. Lewis wrote, "That metaphors,
misread as statements of fact, are the source of monstrous errors, need
hardly be pointed out." 51 The error in Jordan may be less than "mon-
strous"-itself a metaphorical usage-but no less regrettable for that.
The Jordan approach to fiduciary obligation is idiosyncratic in other
respects as well. One is the absence in the opinions of analogies to other
illustrative situations. As noted above,52 given the specific issue in Jor-
dan, partnership seems an obvious source on which to draw. The evolu-
tion of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates, perhaps more
powerfully than most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argu-
mentation. 53 Courts considering whether to impose a fiduciary con-
straint in a novel context rely heavily on comparisons to more
conventional contexts in which the constraint does apply.54 Although
some commentators find this pattern intellectually unsatisfying, 55 its per-
vasiveness and persistence suggest that it is an inevitable aspect of fiduci-
ary analysis.
Judicial opinions applying the fiduciary constraint are also distinc-
tive, among private law cases, in that they frequently and explicitly use
the language of moral obligation to justify their outcomes.5 6 In establish-
50. Lewis, Bluspels and Flalansferes, in THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 36 (M. Black ed.
1962).
51. Id. at 39.
52. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
53. Cf. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4 (1949) ("Reasoning by example
in the law is a key to many things."); Balkin, Too Good To Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of
Law (Book Review), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1447, 1487 (1987) (Conceptual structures, including legal
structures, always evolve through makeshift borrowings from and analogies to existing structures:
"We simply make do with what we have and analogize from it.").
54. See, eg., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 462, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (analogizing
relationship between coadventurers to relationship among partners).
55. See, e.g., J. SHEPHERD, LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 5 (1981); Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF.
L. REV. 795, 805 (1983).
56. Probably the example best known to lawyers in the United States is Chief Judge Cardozo's
assertion in Meinhard v. Salmon that, "A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior." 249 N.Y. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546. Commentators, too, participate in this rhetori-
cal tradition. For example, Professor Scott's article entitled The Fiduciary Principle begins by
quoting the parable in Luke 16:1-8 of the steward accused of wasting his master's goods. Scott, The
Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 539 (1949).
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ing that the imposition of fiduciary obligation in a particular situation
conforms to moral intuition, courts may be responding to the situation-
specific quality of the obligation. They may also be responding to the
stringency of the standards for assessing a fiduciary's behavior, as well as
to the high social value placed on trust. In short, this pattern of judicial
justification, far from constituting mere "sermonizing," 57 may tell us
something important about the nature of fiduciary obligation itself. At a
minimum, it tells us that courts do not conceive of their function as a
judicial guess about what the parties would have agreed to!
II. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION CONTRASTED WITH CONTRACT LAW
Although the "hypothetical bargain" conception of fiduciary obliga-
tion is gravely mistaken, some aspects of contract law do respond to cir-
cumstances that may accompany the imposition of fiduciary obligation.
Exploring these apparent similarities enables a more precise specification
of fiduciary obligation's contribution to legal analysis. Accordingly, this
part of the Article contrasts fiduciary obligation with selected aspects of
contract law with which it shares intriguing similarities. The part first
examines the contractual obligation to act in good faith. It then con-
trasts fiduciary obligation with those aspects of contract law that specifi-
cally address parties' vulnerability to problematic transactions and other
parties' misbehavior.
A. The Obligation to Act in Good Faith.
Like fiduciary obligation, the obligation to act in good faith arises in
a variety of contexts. Both obligations operate to limit a party's permissi-
ble use of discretion or of a power or advantage obtained over another
person. Both are also protean in their operation, 58 resisting attempts to
capture their meanings in general definitions.59 Moreover, analysis of the
respective rights and duties created by these obligations is often compli-
cated by the presence of an express agreement.
57. Clark, supra note 10, at 76; cf Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Sharehold-
ers' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 11 (1987) (vehemence of courts' moral-
istic rhetoric explained by imprecision of fiduciary principles).
58. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 666, 678-79 (1963); Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 215-17
(1968); Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORoNTo L.J. 1, 1-3 (1975).
59. See infra notes 65-106, 136-60 and accompanying text. Professor Summers argues that the
obligation to act in good faith can best be understood as an "excluder"-that is, as a concept, with-
out a general meaning of its own, that takes on specific meaning in particular contexts by excluding
various forms of bad faith. Summers, supra note 58, at 201.
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Many contracts cases, along with the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, assert that every contract imposes on its parties an obligation of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.60 Like-
wise, section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that,
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement. ' 61 In applying this obligation,
the analysis focuses on the parties' relationship following their agree-
ment, not prior to it.62 As illustrated below, 63 behavior that may be in-
nocuous pre-agreement may become problematic post-agreement, owing
to the constraints imposed by the obligation. In this respect, the contrac-
tual obligation to act in good faith is like fiduciary obligation, which sim-
ilarly requires an analysis that focuses on the parties' positions after their
relationship has been established.64
1. A Limit on Rights Granted by the Agreement or by Law.
Stated generally, the obligation to act in good faith limits a party's discre-
tion to use powers or advantages that it has by virtue of an agreement or,
in some instances, by virtue of law. In Pillois v. Billingsley, 65 for exam-
ple, the Second Circuit treated the good faith obligation as a constraint
on a party's ability to exercise a right expressly granted by an agreement.
In that case, the defendant employed the plaintiff as an agent to obtain
long-term rights to a perfume trademark in the United States; the parties'
written agreement provided that the principal would pay the agent "such
sum as you [the principal], in your sole judgment, may decide is reason-
able."' 66 The agreement further provided: "You [the principal] have
made no other commitment and have no other obligation to me [the
agent] of any kind whatsoever." 67 Read literally, the written agreement
seems to have given the principal unfettered discretion to make any de-
termination it chose about the agent's compensation. The court held that
the agent was entitled to recover the reasonable value of the services he
performed, because the agreement entitled the agent "to have the [princi-
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). The first Restatement con-
tained no such provision. Id. § 205 reporter's note.
61. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). The separate, but equally pervasive, concept of good faith purchase
is beyond the scope of this Article, as is the obligation to negotiate in good faith that is imposed in
some contexts.
62. See id. § 1-203 official comment (concept applies to "performance or enforcement of every
contract or duty within this Act").
63. See infra notes 92, 146-47 and accompanying text.
64. See Weinrib, supra, note 58, at 6 (fiduciary obligation looks to parties' relative positions
following, not preceding, their agreement).
65. 179 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1950).
66. Id. at 207.
67. Id.
Vol. 1988:879]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1988:879
pal] in good faith determine the reasonable value of his services and to
pay him that amount. ' 68 In Pillois, the good faith obligation precluded
the principal from making no determination of the value of the agent's
services; it likewise precluded the principal from determining that the
services had value but failing to pay for them.69
Commentators occasionally characterize the obligation to act in
good faith as one directed at "opportunistic" behavior, or a party's use of
discretion to recapture opportunities foregone upon entering into the
contract.70 While this explanation works neatly in some cases, its ex-
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Pillois provides a useful contrast to cases involving claims for compensation for a defend-
ant's use of a plaintiff's proposal for a new product or improved production technique. In Davis v.
General Foods Corp., 21 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), the plaintiff sent her recipe for a new food
product to General Foods after receiving a letter from General Foods that stated: "We shall be glad
to examine your idea for a new food product, but only with the understanding that the use to be
made of it by us, and the compensation, if any, to be paid therefor, are matters resting solely in our
discretion." Id. at 446. The court held that the defendant was under no obligation to compensate
the plaintiff for its use of her recipe because the defendant's letter was too indefinite to constitute an
offer for a contract. Further, the fact that the letter left any payment to the defendant's "discretion"
defeated the plaintiff's claims based on an implied-in-fact contract or on restitution. Id. at 446-47.
In Pillois, in contrast, the plaintiff performed services for the defendant after the parties agreed in
writing that the plaintiff would act as the defendant's agent. Even read literally, the agreement in
Pillois would not enable the defendant to argue that the parties intended no legal consequences to
flow from the agreement or their relationship.
The facts in Davis more closely resemble those in Osborn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 309 F.2d 99
(9th Cir. 1962), in which an employer solicited suggestions from its employees, using a form that
stated: "Suggestions are submitted with the understanding that the Company shall have the right to
use all those which are adopted, and the decision of the Company shall be final and conclusive as to
the person entitled to a cash award and the amount of such award." Id. at 100 (quoting the form).
The court held that this language was not so clear that the trial court could hold as a matter of law
that Boeing reserved absolute discretion to use a valuable idea without paying for it. The form, in
the court's reading, was susceptible of an interpretation that Boeing had discretion only to determine
whether to use a particular suggestion and which claimant was entitled to a reward for it and then
"to determine in good faith the sum which would reflect the reasonable value of the idea." Id. at
103. The language in Davis, however, by expressly stating that General Foods would determine the
compensation, "if any," to be paid, strongly hints, at a minimum, of the possibility that General
Foods might determine to pay nothing.
70. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REv. 369, 373 (1980); cf Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987)
(implied term in every contract is that "neither party will try to take opportunistic advantage of the
other"), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988).
Developing a definition of "opportunistic" that suffices to explain the outcomes of the cases is
difficult. In particular, it is hard to specify with precision even the general types of opportunities
that a party may not attempt to recapture. Some cases subject an employer's decision to terminate
an employee at will to a standard of good faith. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (long-term employee may not be terminated "with-
out good cause"); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104-05, 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1257 (1977) (jury could find bad faith where employer terminated salesman in order to avoid paying
entire amount of commission due on goods already sold); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (jury could find bad faith where employer terminated factory
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planatory power weakens in cases like Pillois, in which the defendant's
use of discretion was apparently consistent with the express terms of the
written agreement.71 And if the focus of this obligation were the defend-
ant's attempt to recapture lost opportunities, cases holding that the de-
fendant breached the obligation should structure the plaintiff's remedies
around restitutionary norms to compel disgorgement of the benefit
wronofuly-or "opportunistically"-obtained by the defendant at the
plaintiff's expense. The cases, however, articulate no restitutionary prin-
ciple consistent with the criterion of "opportunistic" behavior as the ba-
sis for recovery.
The obligation to act in good faith may also constrain a party's abil-
ity to use a power implicitly granted by law. Cases holding that an em-
ployer's right to terminate an employee at will is subject to a good faith
obligation use that obligation to limit the employer's exercise of a power
granted by the common law.72 Similarly, under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, the obligation of good faith applies to proposals to modify a
contract 73  and to demands for adequate assurance of coun-
terperformance.74 Of course, if the power at issue is itself heavily cir-
cumscribed by the positive law creating it, the party exercising the power
worker who resisted foreman's sexual overtures, and factory personnel manager knew of foreman's
pattern of sexual advances).
Suppose an employee at will is terminated to enable the employer to hire another employee
capable of performing the same work with the same degree of competence but for less compensation.
The employer's action fits within most people's definition of "opportunistic," but the termination
may well pass muster under the "good faith" standard. The cases applying the good faith standard
to terminations involve a variety of factual circumstances. The "good cause" formulation in Cleary
is closest to the facts of the hypothetical, because it might be interpreted to mean that the employer
must establish some deficiency in the employee's job performance in order to justify the termination.
The appellate court's opinion in Cleary expressly notes, nonetheless, that in such litigation the em-
ployee has the burden of proving "some hidden motive" for the discharge. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453
n.5, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 n.5. The plaintiff in Cleary alleged that his union activities were the real
reason for his discharge, and that in terminating him the employer failed to follow its own written
procedures. The court's holding couples these allegations with the employee's longevity of service,
stating that together they operate as "a form of estoppel." Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. Cleary
concludes by placing on the plaintiff at trial "the burden of proving that he was terminated un-
justly." Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. Of course, being terminated "unjustly" potentially encom-
passes much more than termination because of an employer's "hidden motive."
71. Characterizing the obligation to act in good faith as exclusively a response to sequential
performance in contracts does not explain Pillois. See R. POSNER, supra note 44, at 81-82. The
agent in Pillois could, of course, have readily protected itself against the risk of eventual nonpayment
by requiring payment in advance or by declining to give the principal express discretion to determine
payment. Likewise, the fact of sequential performance is not especially helpful in explaining cases
that impose a good faith constraint on an employer's power to terminate an employee at will. See
infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. See e.g., Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 448-49, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 725, 727-28; Fortune,
373 Mass. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256; Monge, 114 N.H. at 132-33, 316 A.2d at 551.
73. U.C.C. § 2-209 official comment 2.
74. Id. § 2-609 official comment 3.
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may serve an essentially ministerial function, like a mortgagee exercising
a power to sell property subject to a mortgage.75 The constraint of a
good faith obligation-like that of fiduciary obligation-applies only to
situations in which a person may exercise discretion.
Additionally, when an agreement creates a relationship in which one
party's decisions can severely limit the benefit that the other party will
derive from the agreement or drastically increase the cost of perform-
ance, the obligation to act in good faith may constrain decisions that
would otherwise be within the parties' independent discretion.76 The de-
cision of the New York Court of Appeals in Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co. typifies a group of cases in which the owner of a literary
or theatrical property, having licensed one party to exploit the property
in a particular medium, subsequently licenses another party to exploit
the property in another medium, to the detriment of the initial licensee.77
The licensor in such cases is subject to an "implied negative covenant"
not to use the ungranted portion of its rights to the detriment of the
earlier licensee.78 Indeed, the court in Kirke La Shelle characterized this
restraint as stemming from "the duty of utmost good faith" that arose
75. See G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 727-29, 732-33 (2d ed. 1970). In contrast, in a contract for
the sale of goods, a buyer's right to resell rightfully rejected goods and a seller's right to resell goods
after a buyer's wrongful rejection include relatively more discretion for the party exercising the
power to sell. Like a creditor who may sell collateral after a debtor's default, the aggrieved buyer or
seller may decide to conduct a private rather than a public sale. U.C.C. §§ 2-603, 2-706, 9-504. The
decision to sell in all three instances is subject to a test of "commercial reasonable[ness]," e.g., id.
§ 9-504 official comment 1, which meshes neatly with the Code's express definition of "good faith"
for merchants in sales transactions: "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade," id. § 2-103(1)(b).
Furthermore, a mortgagee exercising a power to sell is understood to be using a power given to
him for his own benefit. See G. OSBORNE, supra, at 733. In contrast, the constraint of good faith
means that the power to sell goods under the U.C.C. cannot be characterized as one given to the
seller for his exclusive benefit.
76, Of course, all bilateral contracts create in each party an expectation of receiving the other
party's performance. These expectations frequently lead to substantial out-of-pocket expenditures
by one or both parties. Either or both parties may, moreover, forego attractive alternative opportu-
nities. One commentator discerns in the caselaw a developing principle that once a contractual
relationship has been created, "a party has a duty to perform in a manner calculated, at least in part,
to 'protect' the other party." Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 617, 658 (1983) (characterizing relationships between contracting parties as
"quasi-fiduciary").
77. 263 N.Y. 79, 85, 188 N.E. 163, 166 (1933); see also Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 327
(1920); Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
78. See Kirke La Shelle, 263 N.Y. at 84, 188 N.E. at 167.
The terms of the initial license can easily be structured to limit the scope of the implied negative
covenant. See generally 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.11[A] (1987)
(express reservation of motion picture rights violates implied negative covenant; license that does not
expressly provide for exclusivity does not preclude grantor from licensing competitors). The cove-
nant is effectively vitiated if the initial license is nonexclusive, see Hart v. Cort, 83 Misc. 44, 46-47,
144 N.Y.S. 627, 628-29 (Sup. Ct. 1913) (nonexclusive license to produce play), or if the licensor
Vol. 1988:879] FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 897
from the "fiduciary relationship" established by the parties in their
contract.
79
Perhaps the court was using the term "fiduciary" more metaphori-
cally than analytically. If the licensor-licensee relationship in Kirke La
Shelle created a fiduciary obligation, the consequences of that obligation
diverge significantly from the consequences of other fiduciary obliga-
tions. The licensor remained free to act in its own self-interest and,
under the court's formulation, breached its obligation to the licensee only
because the subsequent licensee actually injured the initial licensee.80
Likewise, the damages recovered by the licensee in Kirke La Shelle are
not consistent with fiduciary obligation as conventionally understood.
The licensee recovered half the licensor's proceeds from the subsequent
license, a split-the-benefit approach hostile to the basic restitutionary
principle that supposedly governs remedies for breaches of fiduciary
obligation.81
expressly reserves rights in a medium not granted to the initial licensee, see Macloon v. Vitagraph,
30 F.2d 634, 635-36 (2d Cir. 1929).
79. Kirke La Shelle, 263 N.Y. at 85, 188 N.E. at 166; cf. Cinerama Prods. Corp. v. Schwartz,
147 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (declining to impress equitable lien on motion picture that used
song composed by defendant while he was under exclusive commitment to complete musical score
for plaintiff, but allowing plaintiff to recover $42,500 paid to defendant under agreement for defend-
ant's exclusive engagement).
80. A related body of caselaw addresses the meaning of a party's obligation to use its best
efforts to pursue an activity beneficial to the other party. Express promises to use best efforts are
typical in licensing and franchising agreements. In agreements for exclusive dealing in goods,
U.C.C. § 2-306(2) provides that unless the parties expressly agree otherwise, the seller has an obliga-
tion to use best efforts in supplying the goods, and the buyer has an obligation to use best efforts to
promote their sale. Courts have tolerated competition by the best-efforts promisor with the promisee
unless the promisee demonstrates that the promisor has failed to consider the promisee's interests
equally with its own. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089,
1124 & n. 77 (1981).
81. The split-the-benefit outcome in Kirke La Shelle contrasts sharply with Boardman v.
Phipps, [1967] 2 App. Cas. 46, a leading English case dealing with the consequences of the breach of
a more traditional fiduciary obligation. In Boardman, the defendants were a beneficiary of a trust
that owned shares in a company, and a solicitor serving as an advisor to the trustees of that trust.
The defendants were held liable to account to the trust for profits made in transactions with the
company's shares, even though the effect of the transactions (which included a takeover bid for the
company) benefited the trust financially. Even in cases like Boardman, where the defendants' ac-
tions were not kept secret from their advisees and had a demonstrably positive impact on the value of
trust property, if the fiduciary is liable to account, then that liability covers all profits realized
through transactions offensive to the fiduciary's position. But the House of Lords held that the
Boardman defendants' good faith entitled them to payment "on a liberal scale" for their work and
skill in obtaining the shares and resultant profits; this holding mitigated somewhat the financial
consequences of the litigation for the defendants. Id at 104 (Cohen, L.J.). A general problem in the
law of restitution is separating the plaintiff's traceable interest in property or "profits" from the
defendant's own contribution. See generally G. PALMER, supra note 16, § 2.12, at 161, § 2.13.
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2. Output and Requirements Contracts. Many cases interpret the
significance of the good faith constraint as it applies to parties with the
power to determine quantity in output and requirements contractsA
2
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, as under the common law, if an
agreement gives a seller the right to determine, through its "output," the
quantity of goods that the buyer is obliged to purchase, then an obliga-
tion of good faith in performance expressly limits the seller's discretion to
determine its own output.8 3 Likewise, if under the agreement the buyer
has power to set quantity by reference to its own "requirements," a stan-
dard of good faith performance expressly controls that counterpart
power. 84
As it happens, one of the cases that typically illustrates the power of
fiduciary obligation in the corporate context also involves a requirements
contract and thus furnishes a concrete situation in which to differentiate
the fiduciary constraint from the obligation to act in good faith. In Globe
Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., the plaintiff, a textile company,
sued a utility company to compel specific performance of a requirements
contract for electricity.8 5 At the time of the contract's formation, the
two corporations shared a common director, Mr. Maynard, who was also
the chief stockholder of the textile company. The requirements contract
contained a pricing formula guaranteeing that the buyer would save
money by using electricity instead of steam power, but the contract did
not limit the conditions under which the mills were to be run. The util-
ity's directors approved the contract at Maynard's behest (voting, how-
ever, while he absented himself from the room), and on the basis of
estimates of the mills' likely power needs that were prepared by a utility
employee, whom Maynard separately compensated for the service.
8 6
Soon after the requirements contract went into effect, the textile
company drastically changed the mix of products processed in its mills,
which dramatically increased its power "requirements. '8 7 The estimate
presented to the utility's directors had not forecast such a change. The
contract, by virtue of its pricing formula, soon became a losing one for
the utility; by the time of the litigation, the utility owed the textile com-
82. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 7.17, at 528-29; Weistart, Requirements and Output
Contracts: Quantity Variations Under the U. C C., 1973 DUKE L.. 599.
83. U.C.C. § 2-306(1).
84. Id.. Additionally, the seller or buyer in such relationships cannot be required to tender or
accept a quantity of goods "unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate" or, in the absence
of such an estimate, to any normal or prior quantity, even if the quantity-determining party is acting
in good faith. Id. § 2-306(1) & official comment 3.
85. 224 N.Y. 483, 485, 121 N.E. 378, 378 (1918).
86. Id. at 486-88, 121 N.E. at 378-79.
87. Id. at 488, 121 N.E. at 379.
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pany $11,721.41 for the privilege of supplying it with electricity for free.
The court denied specific performance, emphasizing Maynard's failure to
warn his fellow directors of the likelihood of significant changes in the
textile company's business. 88
But would the outcome in Globe Woolen have been different if the
two corporations had not had a director in common? The alacrity with
which the buyer increased its requirements and the equally sudden shift
in its product mix both appear inconsistent with a buyer's obligation to
use good faith in making decisions that determine quantity.89 Addition-
ally, the equitable nature of the specific performance remedy sought by
the buyer in itself makes the plaintiff's apparent bad faith relevant. Thus,
even if a requirements contract does not oblige the buyer to inform the
seller of aspects of its business plan that could result in large future in-
creases in its requirements, 90 the buyer's power to determine quantity
under such a contract is subject to the good faith constraint. And under
the Uniform Commercial Code, even if the buyer's requirements increase
in good faith, the buyer may not demand any quantity "unreasonably
disproportionate" to any stated estimate or, in the absence of an estimate,
to its prior comparable requirements. 91 On the facts of Globe Woolen,
then, the fiduciary constraint on the corporations' common director
seems to contribute little to the outcome.
In other situations, however, the fiduciary constraint would contrib-
ute much. That the two corporations in Globe Woolen shared a common
director, likely to favor the buyer's interests, means that the parties' dis-
cretion in dealing with each other was limited prior to their formal agree-
ment to enter into the requirements contract.92 Fiduciaries may transact
with their beneficiaries only if they are candid about facts within their
knowledge pertinent to the transaction. To the extent that the good faith
obligation constrains a party's discretion in a requirements contract, it
does so only once the contract is formed and is far from an absolute
obligation to share information.
In addition, good faith obligation looks to how parties actually per-
form and use the powers created by their agreement, and not to their
capacity to deal, as does the "candor" aspect of fiduciary obligation.
93
88. Id. at 491-92, 121 N.E. at 380-81.
89. See U.C.C. § 2-306 official comment 2 (contrasting "sudden expansion" with "normal ex-
pansion undertaken in good faith").
90. See Clark, supra note 10, at 71-72.
91. U.C.C. § 2-306(1).
92. Though the contractual relationship would arise only upon conclusion of the formal agree-
ment, the fiduciary relationship was established when the director accepted the two positions. See
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 181.
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For example, a requirements buyer who secretly invests in a seller's com-
petitor has not violated the good faith constraint; the investment would
not justify the seller's rescission of the contract because it is not an abuse
of the buyer's power to determine quantity. 94 Likewise, a defendant's
subjective motives are relevant to questions of good faith, but may well
be irrelevant to a court's consideration of fiduciary obligation in many
contexts.
95
Most importantly, if a fiduciary obligation constrains a person's dis-
cretion in a particular matter, the obligation is breached if the person
acts self-interestedly. Good faith obligation, on the other hand, permits
actions that are self-interested; 96 the key question is abuse, not benefit to
the actor. In a relationship established by a requirements contract, the
buyer's requirements may vary as a direct result of the buyer's profit-
maximizing business decisions.97 The fundamental assumption that a fi-
duciary may not retain profits derived from transactions undertaken on
behalf of the beneficiary, except with the beneficiary's consent, goes well
beyond the obligation to act in good faith.
In addition, the presence of a fiduciary obligation significantly af-
fects the conduct of litigation by affecting the allocation of burdens of
proof. If a suit challenges a transaction between a fiduciary and a benefi-
ciary, the fiduciary has the burden of proving that it dealt candidly and
fairly with the beneficiary. 98 If the issue is, in contrast, merely whether a
party has breached a contractual obligation, the party alleging the breach
has the burdens of proof.99
Moreover, the remedies available to a beneficiary in litigation
against a fiduciary differ from standard contract remedies. The benefici-
ary is entitled to restitution of any benefit realized by the fiduciary
through the breach, or alternatively may recover any loss suffered as a
result of the breach. In order to fully capture these benefits, expansive
remedies, such as the imposition of a constructive trust, may be neces-
sary. 00 Contract remedies, as explained above, 101 are less exotic, and the
94. See U.C.C. § 2-306 official comment 2.
95. See Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 App. Cas. 46, 104 (Cohen, L.J.) (irrelevance of fiduci-
ary's good faith as defense to action for accounting of profits acquired by reason of fiduciary
position).
96. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
97. See U.C.C. § 2-306 comment 2 ("Reasonable elasticity in the requirements is expressly
envisaged by this section and good faith variations from prior requirements are permitted .... The
essential test is whether the party is acting in good faith.").
98. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 585 (5th ed. 1980).
99. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 comment b (1981) ("If the injured
party has suffered loss [caused by the breach] but cannot sustain the burden of proving it, only
nominal damages will be awarded.").
100. Weinrib, supra note 58, at 19.
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plaintiff typically receives only money damages equal to the value of his
lost expectation. Indeed, in many situations, establishing that a party
failed to act in good faith merely excuses the other party's obligation to
counterperform.10 2
Though these differences are far from trivial, one provocative simi-
larity between the two types of obligation also exists. The obligation to
perform in good faith is not susceptible to disclaimer through agree-
ment.10 3 But the parties may control the extent of the obligation through
the type of relationship that they create in their agreement. For example,
a provision in a requirements contract disclaiming the seller's right to
limit the buyer's use of the quantity-setting power under a good faith
criterion would be invalid; a fixed-quantity contract, on the other hand,
by not conferring quantity-setting discretion on either party, does not
implicate this aspect of the good faith constraint.
Fiduciary obligation is, in most respects, susceptible of the same
analysis. If the relationship, as the parties structure it, does not confer
discretion on the "fiduciary," then his actions are not subject to the fidu-
ciary constraint. Even a designated "trustee" may not be a fiduciary if he
entirely lacks authority and thus has no discretionary power.1 4 And if
the "trust" relationship expressly does not require the trustee to adminis-
ter the trust on behalf of the beneficiaries, one would view the parties' use
of the term "trust" as an oxymoron.10 5 This basic point is crucial to
understanding the connection between the parties' express agreement
101. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
102. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 8.15, at 610-11 ("A party whose performance is
hindered or prevented by the other party in violation of the duty of good faith may not be limited to
a claim for damages for the other party's breach. If the breach is material, the injured party can
suspend his performance and, should the breach continue too long, he can terminate.").
103. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
104. See J. SHEPHERD, supra note 55, at 21 n.1 (shell corporation created to act as inactive
trustee may not be under fiduciary obligation).
105. See Lehane, Fiduciaries in a Commercial Context, in ESSAYS IN EQutrrY 95, 101 (P. Finn
ed. 1985) (to say that trustee need not conduct trust's affairs on behalf of beneficiaries is "virtually a
contradiction in terms").
Less extreme examples testing the definition of trusteeship arise in connection with indenture
trustees under corporate debt agreements. The federal Trust Indenture Act of 1939 does not dis-
qualify a financial institution that is a creditor of the issuer of debt securities from serving as an
indenture trustee. The dual trustee-creditor role is inherently one of conflict, however, and one of
palpable conflict if the issuer experiences financial reverses. See Campbell & Zack, Put a Bullet in
the Poor Beast His Leg is Broken and His Use is Past. Conflict of Interest in the Dual Role of Lender
and Corporate Indenture Trustee: A Proposal to End It in the Public Interest, 32 Bus. LAW. 1705,
1720-28 (1977). Prior to enactment of the Trust Indenture Act, which defines the minimum accepta-
ble requirements of the indenture trustee's role, trust indenture language frequently limited the
trustee's responsibilities to essentially ministerial ones. Furthermore, some courts limited the
trustee's obligation to literal compliance with the indenture's express terms. See V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 148-49 (3d ed. 1987).
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and any fiduciary or good faith obligations that may apply. The parties'
express agreement, along with their conduct toward each other, defines
their relationship, while the law defines the obligations inherent in a par-
ticular type of relationship. 0 6 To be sure, we would be profoundly skep-
tical of such agreements in some contexts-a ward's agreement that his
guardian retain profits generated by the ward's property is an obvious
example-but this qualification does not defeat the basic point.
B. Vulnerable Parties and Problematic Transactions.
In many relationships in which one party is bound by a fiduciary
obligation, the other party's vulnerability to the fiduciary's abuse of
power or influence conventionally justifies the imposition of fiduciary ob-
ligation.107 Much of contract law, in contrast, presupposes that "a con-
tract is the result of the free bargaining of parties who are brought
together by the play of the market and who meet each other on a footing
of social and approximate economic equality."10 8 The autonomy and
self-determination of the parties, not their vulnerability, are the key as-
sumptions. Still, many aspects of contract law operate to protect vulner-
able parties against the consequences of unwise or disadvantageous
transactions, in some instances even if the party benefiting from a given
transaction did not behave wrongfully in inducing assent to that transac-
tion. The consequences of these protective or policing functions of con-
tract law nonetheless differ significantly from the imposition of fiduciary
obligation. This Article does not attempt a comprehensive treatment of
all the protective aspects of contract law; it addresses only those aspects
that best illuminate the distinctive characteristics of fiduciary obligation.
The next subsections thus explore the protective character of rules deal-
ing with contract formation and capacity to contract, as well as some of
the doctrines that regulate overreaching and misbehavior in the bargain-
ing process.
106. In the most general sense, of course, the same point can be made about contracts. Along
these lines, the Uniform Commercial Code defines the parties' "agreement" as "the bargain of the
parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance." U.C.C. § 1-201(3). The parties'
"contract," in contrast, is "the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as
affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law." Id. § 1-201(11). Of course, the parties'
agreement and their contract are not identical to any written instrument expressing the agreement.
In the context of a constructive trust, however, legal obligations may be imposed in the absence
of any contract or agreement. See infra note 144.
107. See Frankel, supra note 55, at 809-10.
108. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 630 (1943).
[Vol. 1988:879
FID UCIA R Y OBLIGATION
1. Contract Formation and the Protection of Vulnerable Parties.
Not all agreements create legally enforceable obligations; rules that spec-
ify the conditions for contract formation, although general in their appli-
cation, unquestionably operate to protect some vulnerable parties. For
example, the classical rules of offer and acceptance, by requiring that an
acceptance precisely mirror the terms of the offer to which it responds, 10 9
delay contract formation and thereby create opportunities for reflection
and exit from improvident commitments. By limiting the effectiveness of
silence as a mode of acceptance for offers, 110 these rules also protect the
hapless or inattentive offeree against the officious offeror.
Similarly, an entirely gratuitous undertaking of an obligation is not
enforceable because of the consideration requirement, which conditions
the enforceability of an agreement on a promised exchange of value."11
Strong adherents of the view that contractual obligation is exclusively
rooted in individual self-determination, not surprisingly, find the consid-
eration requirement anomalous. 112 The protective aspect of that require-
ment is itself a major hurdle to any theoretical attempt to reduce contract
law to a statement of principle like "the free arrangements of rational
persons should be respected."1 13 Indeed, these rules of contract forma-
tion may be overprotective and may invite abuses, but their prophylactic
aspects are undeniable.
Capacity doctrines in contract law have a self-evidently protective
function. They protect general categories of persons who lack the requi-
site capacity to contract-in individual instances, justifiably or not-
from obligations that they have undertaken. Thus, contracts entered into
by infants or the mentally infirm, two categories of persons whose pre-
sumptive vulnerability is evident, are voidable by the infant1 4 or the
mentally incompetent person.1 15 The differences between the conse-
quences of contractual incapacity and fiduciary obligation, as they pro-
tect quintessentially vulnerable parties, are, however, significant.
Contracts entered into by infants are voidable by the infant but are other-
wise enforceable on their terms; also, if an infant affirms a contract after
reaching the age of majority, a court does not evaluate the fairness or
109. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 3.13, at 138.
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981).
111. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 2.5.
112. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 35 (1981).
113. Id.
114. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 4.4.
115. Id. §§ 4.2, 4.6.
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wisdom of the contract's terms if either party subsequently breaches.1 16
In short, the protective function of the capacity requirement is confined
to the infant's choice to affirm or disaffirm the contract; the law trusts the
former infant's acuity and self-interest in determining which contracts to
affirm and which to avoid.
In contrast, if the infant or mentally incompetent person has a
guardian, the norms of fiduciary obligation and the applicable statutes
pervasively regulate that relationship. For example, in all jurisdictions
the guardian must obtain court approval to sell real estate belonging to
the ward. 117 Transactions between guardians and their wards are pre-
sumptively invalid and voidable by the ward.118 An infant ward's ability
to disaffirm contracts entered into with his guardian may reach contracts
made even after the infant has attained the age of majority. In order to
enforce such a contract, the guardian has the burden of showing that the
challenged transaction "was understood, was fair and reasonable, and
that no advantage was taken" by the guardian. 119 The ward's depen-
dence on the guardian, as the defining feature of their relationship, dic-
tates a presumption of undue influence regarding subsequent transactions
that is inapplicable to the former ward's transactions with other persons.
In addition, the fiduciary duty of loyalty to a ward's interests obliges
the guardian to account for any profits made through use of the ward's
property. Along these lines, in In re Estate of Swiecicki, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that a guardian bank was liable to account to its
ward for the profits it realized by investing the ward's property in the
bank's own savings accounts and certificates of deposit.120 The bank's
interest in these transactions, as a borrower and subsequent lender of the
ward's funds, is in evident conflict with the ward's interest as a lender. A
bank would obviously profit more by borrowing its ward's money at a
lower rather than a higher rate of interest. Equally obviously, banks not
in a fiduciary relationship with a ward are free to profit from their trans-
actions with the ward.
116. Id. § 4.4. Jurisdictions vary in the extent to which the minor who disaffirms a contract
must make restitution for value received from the other party's performance of the contract. See id.
§ 4.5.
117. See I H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 565 (2d ed.
1987). In some states court approval is required for all transactions, including mortgages and rent-
als, involving any part of the ward's real or personal property. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-
1301 (1987).
118. E.g., Ostic v. Mackmiller, 53 N.M. 319, 324, 207 P.2d 1008, 1010-11 (1949).
119. Williams v. Canary, 249 F. 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1918).
120. 106 I1. 2d 111, 123, 477 N.E.2d 488, 493 (1985). The court was unpersuaded by the de-
fendant's argument that only its trust department served as the ward's guardian, while any profit was
made by its commercial department. The court held that the bank as a whole, and not just one
department, owed the fiduciary duty. Id. at 122, 477 N.E.2d at 492.
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The guardian bank in Estate of Swiecicki paid interest "at the mar-
ket rate, '1 21 but that fact does not justify its retention of the profits. The
fiduciary's obligation to account does not depend on the beneficiary's
ability to demonstrate injury from the self-dealing. The beneficiary's in-
terest might, for example, be best served by a guardian institution that
would not be distracted by self-interest in deciding whether diversifying
the ward's investments would be the best strategy, but the ward does not
have the burden of establishing that the guardian's actions deprived him
of this advantage.
Thus, fiduciary obligation is more intensely protective than contract
law's capacity rules, but only of those relationships to which it applies.
Indeed, the selectiveness with which fiduciary obligation applies further
distinguishes it from the general and indiscriminate applicability of the
capacity rules, which occasionally confer "protection" on persons who
do not need it and who may even be injured by their inability to enter
into prospectively binding commitments. Mature seventeen-year-olds
who want to start businesses are not well served by a rule making all
their contracts voidable. 122 It is much less likely that a ward would be
injured by his guardian's prospective difficulties in purchasing the ward's
property or retaining the profits generated through the guardian's use of
it.
2. Restricting Tactics in the Bargaining Process. Contract law is
also sensitive to some types of behavior in the bargaining process by
which one party may prey upon or exploit the vulnerability of another
party. Some types of behavior, such as intentional misrepresentation and
physical duress, constitute wrongful acts that may be separately actiona-
ble as torts. Other problematic behavior-like nonfraudulent misrepre-
sentations, unconscionability, and economic duress-although less
culpable, may nonetheless justify rescission. As the doctrines addressing
such conduct have evolved, the key concern has become the perceived
unfairness of the resulting transaction to the victim, rather than the cul-
pability of the advantaged party.123
Once again, however, the legal consequences of fiduciary obligation
differ. As applied, the contract doctrines focus on whether the disadvan-
taged party suffered an actual injury. In contrast, as Estate of Swiecicki
illustrates, fiduciary obligation is sensitive to any divergence of the par-
ties' interests, even if it appears that the beneficiary has not, in fact, suf-
121. Id. at 134, 477 N.E.2d at 498 (Ryan, L, dissenting).
122. See E. FAI'swoRTH, supra note 31, § 4.3, at 215.
123. Id. § 4.9, at 234.
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fered a measurable injury. 124
An additional point of comparison is the parties' ability to withhold
information during the bargaining process. As noted above, 125 a party's
affirmative misstatements preceding an agreement may enable the oppo-
site party to avoid the contract. The right to avoid is limited, however,
by the requirement that the party seeking to avoid establish that he relied
on the statement at issue, that the reliance was reasonable, and that the
statement concerned a matter purportedly based on knowledge and did
not merely express the speaker's opinion.12 6
If a fiduciary makes a misstatement to his beneficiary, a court will
assess the statement in light of the fiduciary's obligations to be candid
and to give priority to the beneficiary's interests. In particular, the fidu-
ciary's obligation to be candid weakens the significance of two distinc-
tions drawn by contract law, namely, the distinctions between statements
of fact and statements of opinion and between affirmative misrepresenta-
tions and nondisclosures. Differentiating statements of fact from state-
ments of opinion is less important if the speaker, as a fiduciary, has an
obligation of candor: like the common director in Globe Woolen, the
fiduciary may often be obliged to share his opinion honestly with the
beneficiary of the relationship. 127 Further, the fiduciary may be liable to
the beneficiary for losses that result from the beneficiary's reliance on the
opinion. 128 Contract law also differentiates instances of "simple nondis-
closure" from affirmative misstatements, and only recently, in narrowly
delimited instances, has permitted "simple nondisclosure" to justify
avoiding a contract. 129 For fiduciaries, who must be candid, the distinc-
tion is irrelevant.
3. Complementary Insights from Fiduciary Analysis. Occasion-
ally, the legal consequences of fiduciary obligation complement rather
than conflict with the results of contract analysis as applied to an identi-
cal instance of problematic behavior. The facts of a 1917 Kentucky
Supreme Court case, McDevitt v. Stokes, 130 suggest an especially vivid
example. Contemporary contracts scholars treat McDevitt as an illustra-
124. See 106 I1. 2d at 119, 477 N.E.2d at 491.
125. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text (output and requirements contracts).
126. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 4.14.
127. See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 489, 121 N.E. 378, 380
(1918) ("The trustee... cannot rid himself of the duty to warn and to denounce ....").
128. The liability of investment advisers and money managers to their clients for the negligent
preparation or rendition of investment advice illustrates the application of this principle. See 2 T.
FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 645-59 (1978).
129. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 4.11.
130. 174 Ky. 515, 192 S.W. 681 (1917).
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tion of an extreme application of the "prior duty" rule for modifications
of agreements.13 1 In McDevitt, the owners of a horse named Grace hired
the plaintiff, a jockey, to drive Grace in a trotting race. Subsequent to
the jockey's engagement, but prior to the race, the defendant, who owned
horses related to Grace, promised to pay the jockey an additional $1000
if Grace won the race. Grace (and the jockey) won, but the defendant
reneged. The court held that the defendant's promise was unenforceable
because when the defendant made it the jockey, as an agent of Grace's
owner, "was already morally and legally bound to perform the service
required of him." 132
Contract law polices agreements to modify prior contracts in an ef-
fort to limit a party's ability to exploit another party's need to receive an
already-agreed-to performance. The common law in some jurisdictions
and section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code determine whether
assent to a proposed modification has been improperly extorted, that is,
whether the proposal has been made in good faith. The prior duty rule,
in contrast, applies without regard to whether the proponent of the modi-
fication has acted in good faith; McDevitt thus seems close to a preposter-
ous application of the rule, because the jockey owed his prior duty to
Grace's owner, not to the defendant.
The complementary insights afforded by the principles of fiduciary
obligation stem from the fact that the jockey in McDevitt was surely an
agent of Grace's owners: they engaged him, subject to their control, to
act on their behalf in driving Grace in a particular race. True, the
jockey-horse owner relationship might not be the first that comes to mind
as a quintessential agent-principal relationship, but the relationship satis-
fies all elements of any conventional definition of agency. 133 An agent is
bound by a fiduciary obligation to his principal, which encompasses a
duty to account to the principal for any value received from third parties
in connection with the agent's services on behalf of the principal, unless
the principal consents to the agent's retention of the value received. 134
On the McDevitt facts, unless Grace's owners consented to the jockey's
131. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 4.21, at 273; cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 73 (1981) (performance of legal duty owed to a promisor that is neither doubtful nor the
subject of honest dispute is not consideration).
132. McDevitt, 174 Ky. at 517, 192 S.W. at 681.
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on
his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."). See generally J. HUM-
PHREYS, RACING LAW 283-99 (1963) (discussing nature of employment relationships between horse
owner and jockey).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (unless otherwise agreed, agent who prof-
its in transactions on behalf of principal is under duty to give profit to principal).
Vol. 1988:879]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
retention of the payment, the jockey had an obligation to account to
them for his secret profit. The agent's fiduciary obligation to his princi-
pal, however, does not address the enforceability of the third party's
promise to make the payment; fiduciary obligation prescribes only that if
the agent secretly receives such a payment, he must account for it to his
principal. 3
5
McDevitt also neatly illustrates the rationale for the "secret profits"
rule. If the jockey is free to receive and retain payments from third par-
ties without the consent of Grace's owners-payments that are nonethe-
less contingent on Grace's victory-his incentives to win may lead him to
employ tactics inconsistent with the interests of Grace's owners. They
presumably want Grace to survive the race in addition to winning it!
This central preoccupation of fiduciary obligation-minimizing potential
or incipient conflicts in parties' interests-is not a concern of contract
law.
III. GENERAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
Legal commentators have made several attempts to develop general
justifications for fiduciary obligation; that is, to describe in a comprehen-
sive and analytic fashion those aspects of relationships that justify impo-
sition of fiduciary constraints. This part explores the strengths and
limitations of four distinct attempts to capture that ever-elusive prey, fi-
duciary obligation, in a general legal theory. Although much can be
learned from such attempts to state general justifications for the fiduciary
constraint, the explanatory power of each attempt is limited.
In part, fiduciary obligation eludes theoretical capture because it
arises in diverse types of relationships. Common characteristics of such
relationships include the fiduciary's commitment to exercise discretion in
a fashion that affects the interests of the beneficiary and the fiduciary's
obligation to exercise that discretion on the beneficiary's behalf. Para-
digms of such relationships include agent-principal, director-corporation,
guardian-ward, lawyer-client, partner-fellow partner, and trustee-trust
beneficiary relationships. The scope of the fiduciary's obligation, as well
as the obligation's precise formulation, necessarily varies with the con-
text of the relationship. As the law has developed, trustees are under
135. A principal may have an action in restitution against a third party who agrees to pay a
secret commission to an agent in connection with a transaction between the principal and the third
party, whether the commission is paid or not. Compare Donemar, Inc. v. Molloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169
N.E. 610 (1930) and Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509
(1942) (third party liable to principal for amount of secret commission promised to agent) with
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITrruTION § 138(2) (1937) (third party who colludes with fiduciary in com-
mitting breach of duty and thereby receives benefit is under duty to make restitution to beneficiary).
[Vol. 1988:879
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
more stringent restrictions in their dealings with trust property than are
corporate directors in their personal transactions with the corporation.
136
As noted above, 137 that a particular relationship fits within one of these
conventional categories does not end the analysis, for the parties may
have defined the characteristics of the relationship such that they fore-
close the applicability of the fiduciary constraint.
The theoretical challenge has thus been to develop an account of
fiduciary obligation that is more than merely descriptive and is suffi-
ciently analytic to permit its predictable application to a variety of di-
verse relationships and factual circumstances. This task is indeed of
considerable practical import. Many courts are obviously willing to con-
sider applying fiduciary obligation in situations beyond the conventional
categories, including, in recent years, commercial franchises, 138 distribu-
torship relationships, 139 a bank's relationship with its borrowers x40 and
its depositors,' 4 ' and the relationship between holders of executive and
nonexecutive interests in oil and gas estates.' 42 But, just as obviously, the
mere existence of such a relationship does not mean that the parties to it
always owe each other obligations of a fiduciary character. The question
becomes whether one can articulate any general theory that justifies the
imposition of fiduciary obligation, depending on the particular facts,
across such a diverse group of relationships. The answer appears to be
that only an instrumental view of fiduciary obligation can address such a
diversity of contexts. That is, viewed exclusively from an internal per-
spective, one limited to the logic of the concept itself, fiduciary obligation
is inevitably tied to the particular context in which it arises. A general
account of fiduciary obligation thus requires at least modest use of an
external perspective to explain the recurrence of common (but variable)
principles in such different contexts. According to this view, courts im-
pose fiduciary constraints whenever one person's discretion ought to be
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 2 comment b (1959) ("The duties of a trustee
are more intensive than the duties of some other fiduciaries."); R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw § 5.1
(1986) (discussing the relaxation of restrictions on corporate directors).
137. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
138. See Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918
(1980).
139. See Hospital Prods., Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp., 55 A.L.R. 417 (Austl. 1984).
140. See Barrett v. Bank of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20-21
(1986) (borrower perceived relationship with banker as "very close" and relied on banker's financial
advice); see also Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 422, 196 N.W.2d 619, 623 (1972)
(duty may arise in "special circumstances" where bank knows or has reason to know customer is
placirig trust in bank and relying on bank to counsel and inform him).
141. See Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209 Cal. Rptr.
551, 554 (1985).
142. See Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183-84 (Tex. 1984).
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controlled because of characteristics of that person's relationship with
another. So much varies in the application of fiduciary principles in par-
ticular contexts that the conception of fiduciary obligation itself is unable
to justify its applicability, as a general matter and irrespective of context.
This view, however, does not deny that the concept of fiduciary obliga-
tion has content, or that the content is cogent and intelligible; any gen-
eral theory of fiduciary obligation that ignored this content would lack
integrity and persuasiveness.
A. Voluntary Assumption Theories.
Some commentators stress the importance of the fiduciary's volun-
tary assumption of a position that requires him to further the interests of
another. Along these lines, in 1949 Professor Austin Scott wrote: "Who
is a fiduciary? A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the inter-
est of another person. It is immaterial whether the undertaking is in the
form of a contract. It is immaterial that the undertaking is gratui-
tous."' 143 Imposition of the fiduciary obligation is in this view justified
because the fiduciary himself "undertakes" to put himself in a position
that imparts such an obligation. This view is unquestionably true in
many relationships in which fiduciary obligations apply, including trusts,
guardianships, and agency relationships.
But exceptions too significant to dismiss undercut the appeal of
Scott's formulation as a general justification. In some relationships, de-
termining the precise nature of the parties' "undertaking" is a difficult
task. And in some situations, Scott's formulation does not work at all.
In what sense, for example, has a constructive trustee "undertaken" to
act in the interests of the beneficiaries of the constructive trust? Typi-
cally the trust beneficiaries are the plaintiffs in litigation in which a court
has imposed a constructive trust as a remedy. Only an overly attenuated
conception of the trustee's "undertaking" could make sense in this
context. 144
143. Scott, supra note 56, at 540. A subsequent writer characterized Scott's conception of fiduci-
ary obligation as essentially contractual, despite the disclaimer quoted above. J. SHEPHERD, supra
note 55, at 65. Inasmuch as Scott's discussion does not deal with issues like intent, which would
seem to underlie any contractual conception of the basis of the duty, it is preferable to give the
"undertaking" language a less technical reading.
144. Cf Stoljar, Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice, 50 MOD. L. REV. 603, 610 (1987)
(characterizing constructive trust as example of situation in which person has fiduciary obligation
thrust upon him). A contemporary example of the imposition of a constructive trust in the corpo-
rate context is Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985). In
Heckmann the trial court, through a preliminary injunction, effectively imposed a constructive trust
on the profit made by a group of shareholders when the corporation repurchased their stock. The
sellers had acquired their shares as part of a takeover bid for the issuer; in the course of the takeover
contest, these shareholders brought a derivative action against the issuer's directors, challenging
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Similarly, corporate law in the United States treats majority or con-
trolling shareholders in corporations, at least in the exercise of some of
their powers, as fiduciaries of minority shareholders. 145 Scott's formula-
tion applies to such a relationship awkwardly, at best. When does the
majority shareholder's undertaking to act on behalf of the minority oc-
cur-when the majority position is initially assembled, or when the ma-
jority exercises its powers?
Scott's formulation is also difficult to apply to relationships, like
partnerships, that ultimately may be defined by a formal written agree-
ment among the parties, but that, prior to the agreement, impose fiduci-
ary obligations on the parties. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, each
partner is accountable to the partnership for profits that he derives "from
any transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of
the partnership or from any use by him of its property." 146 Scott's for-
mulation implicitly suggests that at an identifiable moment, fiduciary ob-
ligation is "undertaken," but the relationship among prospective partners
may evolve less neatly and more fluidly. And suppose the future partners
never reach final accord on the precise terms of their agreement. A
search for the parties' dispositive "undertaking" of fiduciary obligation
will only waylay analysis of the parties' relationship. Surely the appro-
priate inquiry is broader and encompasses whether the relationship was
characterized by mutual trust and confidence, or whether it failed to pro-
gress beyond mere arm's-length negotiation. 147
their opposition to the takeover bid. The share repurchase eliminated the plaintiffs' standing to
prosecute the claims on behalf of the corporation's remaining shareholders. The court of appeals
held that, in bringing the derivative action, the shareholders assumed a fiduciary position that they
could not properly abandon for purely private benefit. lId at 128-29, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 183-83. Thus,
in the appellate court's view, the trial court appropriately treated the profits realized by the erstwhile
representative plaintiffs as subject to a constructive trust.
145. See R. CLARK, supra note 136, § 11.4, at 488-90, § 12.3.5, at 525.
146. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 21(1) (1969); see J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PART-
NERSHIP 394 (1968).
147. See United Dominions Corp. v. Brian Proprietary, 60 A.L.R. 741, 747 (Austl. 1985) (rela-
tionship will "ordinarily" be fiduciary if intending partners have reached informal agreement to
become partners and have taken steps to establish or implement partnership relationship).
In the United States, the Uniform Partnership Act defines partnership as "an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6(l).
The "association" requirement, according to the official comment, "implies the acting together of
two or more persons ... to carry on a business." Id. official comment 1. If the business is not
carried on after the parties reach agreement and after they make partnership contributions, the par-
ties are still partners. See id Thus, under this definition, persons negotiating a definitive partnership
agreement who act together short of carrying on an ongoing business would be partners even if their




In contrast, some commentators stress the "entrusting" element in
many relationships to which the fiduciary constraint applies. A trustee,
for example, holds and manages property solely on behalf of beneficiaries
of a trust; the trust property is thus "entrusted" to its holder subject to
the fiduciary constraint.148 The entrusting conception works best as ap-
plied to relationships in which the fiduciary's role is that of a property-
holder, with the trust serving as a powerful prototype.149 In other types
of relationships in which a party is subject to fiduciary constraints, speci-
fying precisely what has been entrusted is difficult. Especially difficult to
rationalize under this theory is the imposition of the fiduciary restraint
upon relationships in which the fiduciary's role is to advise the benefici-
ary. What exactly has been "entrusted" to a lawyer by a client, apart
from the client's confidence in the lawyer?' 50
The Jordan case, which involved a corporation's repurchase of an
employee-shareholder's stock, 151 itself defies satisfactory analysis under
this conception of fiduciary obligation. Which of the corporation's pow-
ers are "entrusted" to it subject to the encumbrance of fiduciary obliga-
tion? Only those powers relating to transactions directly between itself
and its own shareholders? Or all powers that may affect shareholders'
interests? Suppose the corporation, through its directors, adopts a divi-
dend policy unfavorable to the economic interests of an identifiable cadre
of shareholders. Is this use of the corporation's power to make dividend
decisions a breach of its fiduciary obligation to all shareholders? Would
the same analysis apply if the corporation's directors adopted a business
plan with the same disparate impact on identifiable shareholder interests?
The "entrusting" conception of fiduciary obligation is also unper-
suasive as applied to cases in which the fiduciary's use of power yields a
benefit that the beneficiary would not have been legally entitled, for other
reasons, to obtain directly for itself. Several cases hold employees and
other agents liable to account to their employers or principals for an ille-
gal bribe taken from a third person.152 Surely the principal did not "en-
trust" to the agent the power to extract bribes from third parties! If the
subject of the fiduciary encumbrance is defined more broadly, perhaps as
148. See J. SHEPHERD, supra note 55, at 96 (proposing theory of transfer of encumbered power).
149. Id. at 22-23.
150. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983) (precluding lawyer from
representing client if representation adversely affected or limited by responsibilities to another
client).
151. Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cerL dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067
(1988).
152. E.g., Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 597, 115 A.2d 8, 16 (1955); Reading v. Attorney-
General, 1951 App. Cas. 507.
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the power to deal with third parties on the principal's behalf, the facts
that the power was used for an illegal end, and thus that the principal
could not itself directly use the power to the same end, make it hard to
explain why the proceeds of the transaction belong to the principal.
C. Descriptive Theories.
Other general approaches lend themselves less readily to analytic
use and instead only describe traits that relationships may have if the
fiduciary constraint applies to them. The first, most fully expounded by
Gareth Jones, advocates use of the principle of unjust enrichment to aid
inquiry into whether the fiduciary has breached his duty and, in some
situations, what relief should be available to the complaining benefici-
ary.153 Unjust enrichment is undoubtedly a useful concept in many situ-
ations that raise perplexing questions of fiduciary obligation. For one
thing, it helps explain the outcome in the bribe cases described above, in
which the fiduciary cannot defend against the plaintiff-principal's action
by arguing that no benefit was taken because the bribe in many respects
did not "belong" to the principal. 154 Under this line of inquiry, the fact
that the agent would be unjustly enriched if he could retain the bribe is
dispositive. But the principle of unjust enrichment cannot explain as a
general matter why some people are under the fiduciary constraint and
others are not, and it inevitably requires a case-by-case examination of
particular facts to determine whether the obligation applies. The unjust
enrichment principle, moreover, cannot explain why some fiduciaries
may not retain profits realized through their positions even though they
acted honestly in obtaining them.155
153. Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW Q. REv. 472, 474-
75 (1968).
154. See id. at 476-77.
155. See, e.g., Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 App. Cas. 46, 104 (Cohen, L.J.). In contrast, in
some jurisdictions, corporate directors may pursue "corporate opportunities" with impunity if they
first offer the opportunity in question to the corporation and disinterested directors or shareholders,
following appropriate disclosure by the directors, reject the opportunity. See Klinicki v. Lundgren,
298 Or. 662, 681-82, 695 P.2d 906, 920 (1985). The House of Lords in Boardman emphasized the
trust beneficiaries' lack of consent to the defendants' pursuit of the opportunity and the fact that
knowledge of the opportunity came to the defendants through their advisory relationship to the
trust. Additionally, had the trustees required advice on whether to pursue the opportunity for the
trust, they would have turned to their solicitor, Boardman, for advice. Boardman's purchases of
shares for himself thus created, in the Lords' view, a possible conflict between his personal interest
and his duty.
The emphasis given these points in Boardman differs from the focus of corporate opportunity
cases in the United States, which do not treat a director's personal interest in her corporation's
rejection of a given opportunity as impermissibly creating a conflict with the director's duty to advise
fellow directors, so long as the decision to reject the opportunity is made by disinterested directors.
The "interested" director's need to recuse herself from participating in that decision deprives her
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Finally, some commentators emphasize characteristics of the rela-
tionships between fiduciaries and their beneficiaries that may, in some
situations, invite abuse by fiduciaries. A beneficiary in significant re-
spects depends upon and is vulnerable to the fiduciary. The power held
by the fiduciary that enables him to act to benefit the beneficiary also
enables him to indulge his own interest and to injure the beneficiary.
156
One major contribution of this emphasis is that it helps to explain the
strongly prophylactic character of fiduciary rules, which often seem
structured to deter the fiduciary from undertaking particular types of
transactions, whatever their merits may in retrospect turn out to be. But
a general approach to fiduciary obligation needs to justify the presence of
the fiduciary constraint in relationships between parties who are appar-
ently able, at least prior to the relationship, to protect their own interests.
A generalized emphasis on "dependency" might also suggest that courts
would be more inclined to impose fiduciary constraints in situations in
which the fiduciary's behavior has actually harmed the beneficiary. The
analogy to aspects of contract law, like the unconscionability and duress
doctrines, which examine whether one party has actually exploited the
other party's vulnerability, would be clear. Instead, such litigation typi-
cally focuses upon the benefit realized by the fiduciary.
Moreover, the law of fiduciary obligation is inapplicable to some sit-
uations in which one party is evidently vulnerable to abuse by another.
One long-standing example is the relationship between a guarantor and a
principal debtor for whose obligation the guarantor is secondarily liable.
A principal debtor is under no general obligation to refrain from transac-
tions that increase his risk of default and thus the likelihood that the
guarantor will be obliged to satisfy the debt. Many of these transactions
will also reduce the principal debtor's ability to satisfy the guarantor's
subsequent claim for reimbursement. 157 If the principal debtor indulges
in a fraudulent conveyance, that is, a transfer of its assets, without fair
consideration, that renders it insolvent, the guarantor can have the fraud-
ulent conveyance set aside. 158 But many transactions may increase the
guarator's risk and still fall short of the fraudulent conveyance standard.
fellow directors, and the corporation, of the benefit of her advice. Based on Boardman, one might
argue that the director, by accepting and retaining that office, thereby comes under a duty not to
create obstacles to her ability to participate in decisions to be made by directors. See generally
Austin, Fiduciary Accountability for Business Opportunities, in EQUITY AND COMMERCIAL RELA-
TIONSHIPS 141 (P. Finn. ed. 1987) (discussing formulations of U.S. corporate opportunity doctrine in
relation to developments in Australian and English law).
156. See Frankel, supra note 55, at 800, 810.
157. Cf RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 112 (1941) (surety's right to exoneration by principal
debtor).
158. See id. § 113 (surety can have fraudulent conveyance set aside if surety would have a right
of exoneration against principal debtor, were principal's obligation due).
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Guarantors, in short, seem no less vulnerable to injury inflicted by their
principal debtors than principals are to abuse by their agents.
One could justifiably conclude that the law of fiduciary obligation is
in significant respects atomistic. 159 Common core principles may justify
the outcomes reached by courts in types or patterns of relationships, but
they lose force as applied to other types of relationships. Or, as Professor
Finn has described the state of the law, "each duty itself defines the type
of relationship to which it applies-each defines who is a fiduciary for its
purposes... each duty exacts its own standard of acceptable conduct
from the fiduciary to whom it applies." 160 Described instrumentally, the
fiduciary obligation is a device that enables the law to respond to a range
of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one person's discretion
ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person's relation-
ship with another. This instrumental description is the only general as-
sertion about fiduciary obligation that can be sustained.
IV. FIDUCIARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW
Defining the nature and scope of fiduciary obligation in the corpo-
rate context is a daunting task. This part of the Article tackles two
somewhat narrower issues: First, what is the significance of some courts'
assumption that a corporation owes a fiduciary obligation to its own
shareholders? Second, in what respects is the notion of "contracting
out" of fiduciary obligation an intelligible one in the corporate context?
Two basic points require initial clarification. It is helpful to distin-
guish between the fiduciary obligation as it applies to parties within cor-
porations and other duties that may be owed to a corporation that are
not distinctively fiduciary in character. Corporate directors, for example,
who surely occupy a fiduciary office, also owe the corporation a duty of
care in fulfilling their office. That duty, however, is not distinctively fidu-
ciary; many persons, by virtue of the law or their own contractual under-
takings, owe duties of care to other persons with whom they have
nonfiduciary relationships. For example, motorists owe duties of care to
pedestrians and to fellow motorists but are not, by virtue of these rela-
tionships, under any fiduciary constraint in their pursuit of self-interest!
159. See P. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 4 (1977); see also Sealy, supra note 4, at 73 (term
"fiduciary" not definitive of single class of relationships to which fixed set of rules and principles
applies); Sealy, supra note 11 (discussing diverse rules applicable to various categories of fiduciaries).
160. P. FINN, supra note 159, at 4. Viewed from this perspective, the law of fiduciary obligation,
protean in nature, closely resembles the contractual obligation to act in good faith. Both are suscep-
tible of principled application, and both are coherent, but neither lends itself to concise statement as
a neat analytic rule. See supra notes 65-106 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, an institutional fact lending considerable importance to
litigation over issues of fiduciary obligation in the United States is the
relative absence of clear, statutory, prophylactic rules regulating the use
of powers by corporate directors and controlling shareholders. The par-
ticular power involved in Jordan-the corporation's power to repurchase
its own shares-is a good example. In the United States, corporation
statutes subject a corporation's repurchase of its own shares to financial
tests, in many instances the same tests applicable to dividend distribu-
tions.161 In other respects, however, statutory corporate law does not
regulate those transactions. Uses of the power to repurchase shares have
attracted litigation that has tested the propriety of those decisions on a
case-by-case basis. 162 As it happens, many other countries subject the
power to repurchase shares to extensive statutory regulation 163 or forbid
such repurchases altogether.16 In this respect, litigation testing particu-
lar repurchase decisions against fiduciary norms replaces general pro-
spective regulation of the use of the power.165
A. The Corporation as a Fiduciary.
Some courts have stated that the corporation itself owes a fiduciary
duty to its shareholders. 66 The Jordan majority, for example, explicitly
assumes that a corporation, in exercising the power to repurchase shares,
must act consistently with a fiduciary obligation owed to its own share-
holders.167 It is odd-or at least curious-to suppose that the corpora-
tion owes a fiduciary obligation to its own shareholders. Analysis reveals
the hopelesly muddled consequences of such an assertion.
161. Massachusetts, alone among the states, has no statutory regulation of distributions, includ-
ing share repurchases and dividends. However, any distribution that renders a corporation insolvent
is illegal. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 61 (Law. Co-op. 1979). For a detailed discussion of
the statutory regulation of distributions through share repurchases, see MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
Acr ANN. § 6.40, at 490-91 (Supp. 1988) (statutory comparison).
162. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985) (directors
acted in good faith, after reasonable investigation, in buying back shares); Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d
548, 556 (Del. 1964) (directors made reasonable decision after direct investigation and professional
advice); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 603, 328 N.E.2d 505, 521 (1975) (direc-
tor of close corporation did not act in utmost good faith and loyalty).
163. See Companies Act, 1985, §§ 162-169.
164. See Companies Code, 1981, § 129(l)(b), (5) (Austl.).
165. See generally DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, in KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 398 (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein
& S, Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988).
166. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 498-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
167. See Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S.
Ct. 1067 (1988).
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Conventionally, one assumes that the corporation itself is owed fidu-
ciary obligations by many persons, including its directors, officers, and
controlling shareholders. If the justification for imposing the fiduciary
constraint in a particular relationship is to prevent or rectify self-inter-
ested uses of power by those subject to the constraint, the concept of
fiduciary obligation implicitly presupposes that persons bound by the ob-
ligation are capable of possessing a self-interest that may diverge from
the interests of the beneficiaries of the obligation. This concept is not
readily applicable to a corporation, the interests of which are generally
treated as identical to those of its shareholders as a group. 168 True, par-
ticular shareholders' interests may diverge from those of other sharehold-
ers, or directors may use their powers inconsistently with the
shareholders' interests, but the notion that in theory a corporation's
"own" interests could diverge from those of its shareholders is difficult to
fathom. Indeed, corporation statutes generally permit a corporation to
have as few as one shareholder, which makes the prospect of conflict
even more unlikely. 1
69
Moreover, the consequences of a rule that a corporation owes a fidu-
ciary obligation to its own shareholders are startling. First, fiduciary ob-
ligation, as conventionally understood, invests nondelegable discretion in
the party bound by the obligation;1 70 corporations, as artificial persons,
can act only through their agents. Even institutional fiduciaries such as
banks and trust companies, which obviously act through natural persons,
can act through employees under the institution's direct control. Corpo-
rate law, however, ascribes ultimate managerial responsibility to a corpo-
ration's directors, 171 who are neither employees nor agents, t72 but who
possess intrinsically discretionary responsibility. A pervasive principle in
corporate law is that directors are not liable for untoward consequences
168. See, eg., R. CLARK, supra note 136, § 1.2, at 17-19; ef Bratton, The Economics and Juris-
prudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 667, 730 (fiduciary duty to corporation distin-
guished from duty to individual stockholders). Interestingly, even commentators who advocate
expanding the scope of fiduciary obligation to encompass holders of debt securities discuss the obli-
gation as one owed not by the corporation itself, but by the corporation's directors. See McDaniel,
Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 268-73 (1988).
169. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, for instance, does not require that a corpora-
tion have any minimum number of authorized or issued shares or holders of shares. Cf REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (1984) (corporation's articles of incorporation must pre-
scribe classes of shares and number of shares for each class that the corporation is authorized to
issue).
170. See P. FINN, supra note 159, at 20.
171. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1987); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b). In both statutes, the directors' responsibility can be modified by contrary provisions in the
corporation's articles or certificate of incorporation.
172. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (1958). Nor is the board of directors as a
body an agent of the corporation. Id. § 14C comment a.
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of decisions made in a good faith exercise of business judgment. 173 In
some states, statutes expressly permit directors, in making specified types
of decisions, to consider the interests of persons and entities other than
shareholders.174 These legal rules are not reconcilable with the proposi-
tion that the corporation itself owes fiduciary obligations to its
shareholders.
7
Second, in many cases, operating a business requires that the busi-
ness undertake commitments and obligations to creditors. These obliga-
tions may require the payment of funds to creditors that might otherwise
be distributed as profits to the business's owners. Some shareholders are
likely to perceive commitments that the corporation makes to particular
creditors as inconsistent with their economic self-interest as sharehold-
ers. Is this type of conflict proscribed by the corporation's fiduciary obli-
gation to its shareholders?
Third, if the corporation owes a fiduciary obligation to each share-
holder individually, does the majoritarian norm for shareholder decision-
making apply to transactions that would otherwise breach the
corporation's fiduciary obligation? Or is the assent of each individual
shareholder necessary?
176
Fourth, and most technically, if we suppose the corporation's inter-
ests to be potentially at odds with those of its shareholders, thus rational-
izing the imposition of the fiduciary constraint on the corporation, could
a shareholder ever sue derivatively on the corporation's behalf, alleging
injury to the corporation? That is, how could a shareholder ever bring a
representative action on behalf of an entity whose interests conflicted
with his? 17
7
Perhaps Jordan's assertion that a corporation owes a fiduciary obli-
gation to its own shareholders merely reflects the judges' efforts to justify
173. See R. CLARK, supra note 136, § 3.4.
174. For example, under the Missouri statute, directors evaluating an acquisition proposal "may
consider... [s]ocial, legal and economic effects on employees, suppliers, customers and others hav-
ing similar relationships with the corporation, and the communities in which the corporation con-
ducts its businesses." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1988); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1988) (directors can consider interests of employees, customers, suppli-
ers, creditors, and the economy, as well as community and social considerations); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1987) (same).
175. See J. SHEPHERD, supra note 55, at 351-52 (director has fiduciary responsibility to
shareholders).
176. See infra note 193 and accompanying text; see also supra note 155 (shareholder rejection of
corporate opportunity).
177. The early authorizations for such actions in U.S. caselaw clearly distinguished derivative
actions brought by shareholders on behalf of corporations from actions involving "real contests" or
"controvers[ies]" between a plaintiff shareholder and a corporation. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104
U.S. 450, 453-54 (1881).
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their decision to impose to a duty to disclose material information to any
shareholder from whom a corporation repurchases shares. Analysis at
this point is complicated by the applicability of federal securities law to
transactions involving the purchase or sale of shares. 17 The basic an-
tifraud and antimanipulation provision in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, section 10(b), prohibits the use, in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities, of any "manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance," as defined by rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.1 79 Under the U.S. Supreme Court's recent interpretations
of this section, a party's failure to disclose information to another party
to a transaction is "deceptive" if it violates a duty to disclose owed to the
other party. 180 Inevitably, the Court's interpretation requires reference
to bodies of law, other than section 10(b) itself, that create duties to dis-
close. The content of this aspect of federal securities regulation is thus
parasitic on other law, often including state-law principles of fiduciary
obligation.181
178. In Jordan, the plaintiff alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as well as breaches of fiduciary duty and common law fraud. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.,
[1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,724 (N.D. Ill. 1986), rev'd, 815 F.2d 429
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988).
179. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
180. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983).
181. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY REGULATION 726-38 (2d ed. 1988)
(analyzing Rule lOb-5 caselaw). Nonetheless, in some respects it may be misleading to equate the
duties to disclose imposed by federal securities regulation with those defined by courts interpreting
the fiduciary constraint in a corporate context. Numerous provisions in the federal securities stat-
utes and the SEC's rules require the disclosure of "all material facts." Within the Securities Ex-
change Act itself, the "material fact" language appears in sections 14(e) and 18(a). 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78n(e), 78r(a) (1982). The SEC has frequently used this terminology in rules defining prohibited
conduct. See, eg., Rule lOb-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1988) (purchase or sale of security);
Rule 13e-3(b)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(b)(1)(ii) (going-private transactions by issuers and affili-
ates); Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (proxy solicitation); cf Rule 14e-3(d)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14(e)(3)(d)(1) (prohibition on certain communications of "material, non-public information"
concerning tender offers).
In contrast, as the Delaware Supreme Court and Chancery Court have articulated it, the fiduci-
ary's obligation in the corporate context is one of "complete candor." See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977).
The Delaware Supreme Court has occasionally used the "material facts" standard to assess whether
a party has complied with its obligation of complete candor. Eg., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493
A.2d 929, 944-45 (Del. 1985). But cf Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between Federal Securities Law
and State Corporation Law, 12 J. CORP. L. 73, 98-99 (1986) (emphasizing significance of Delaware
standard of rescissory damages). As applied to some types of information, an obligation of "com-
plete candor" may require more extensive disclosure than the materiality standard requires. Com-
plete candor suggests a sharing of all information taken into account or, at the least, all information
relied upon by the fiduciary in making its decision to pursue a particular transaction. The material
fact standard, in contrast, focuses exclusively on the decisionmaking process of the reasonable share-
holder and on the types of information that, hypothetically, such a shareholder would consider
significant. See, eg., TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omitted fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important
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If the corporation itself is not bound by a fiduciary obligation to its
shareholders, should the outcome be different when a corporation repur-
chases its own shares? That is, is the conceptually muddled ascription of
fiduciary obligation to the corporation necessary to the plaintiff's suc-
cess? The corporation's directors surely owe a fiduciary obligation to the
corporation, and, in the United States, are often assumed to owe such an
obligation directly to the corporation's shareholders as well.182 If direc-
tors cause the corporation to repurchase shares without disclosing perti-
nent information to the selling shareholders, the nonselling shareholders
(the corporation) benefit from the director's breach of duty1 83 and are
presumably accountable for the benefit they receive.
184
In cases like Jordan, one would not be surprised if the directors
themselves were nonselling shareholders, with a personal pecuniary in-
terest in the transaction. The directors in such a situation do not breach
their obligations by purchasing shares for their own personal accounts,
but they use their power in a fashion inconsistent with the interests of the
selling shareholders. Indeed, prior cases permit individual shareholders
to sue directly when the directors misuse their powers in causing the
corporation to repurchase the shares.18 5 That an individual action is per-
mitted, and the claim is not treated as one that must be asserted deriva-
tively on the corporation's behalf, is consistent with treating the
director's duty as one owed directly to the shareholders, even though the
corporation itself purchases the shares. If the directors do not own
shares themselves, and thus lack a personal pecuniary interest in the
transaction, they breach a fiduciary obligation owed directly to the cor-
poration's shareholders if they benefit nonselling shareholders by failing
to deal candidly with the sellers.
186
Should the outcome be different if the jurisdiction permits directors
to purchase stock for themselves from the corporation's present share-
holders without disclosing relevant nonpublic information known to the
in deciding how to vote."). Additionally, the uniform use of the materiality standard in the securi-
ties regulatory scheme inevitably raises the question whether a general or a transaction-specific
threshold of relevance is being used. The standard of complete candor, in contrast, is certainly a
situation-specific standard, as its origins in Equity make clear. See supra notes 7-10 and accompany-
ing text.
182. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 627 (3d ed. 1983).
183. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 347 & n.79 (1979); Gabaldon, supra note 18, at 1261.
184. See G. PALMER, supra note 16, § 2.20, at 221. Even a person who innocently benefits from
another's wrongful act is obliged to make restitution, unless he has given value for the benefit. Id.
185. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
186. See Brudney, supra note 183, at 347.
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directors but not the selling shareholders? 187 Such a jurisdiction is likely
to distinguish between a director's purchases in his individual capacity
and his official use of power to cause the corporation to repurchase
shares. 188 If the director benefits personally through the corporation's
purchase of shares, and the director knows price-relevant information
not shared with the selling shareholders, the director acquires this benefit
in breach of his fiduciary obligation. The selling shareholder may rescind
the transaction or recover money damages equal to the difference be-
tween the shares' value and their sale price.18 9 In the end, it is difficult to
identify the analytic contribution of giving the corporation a fiduciary
obligation to its own shareholders-but analysis of fiduciary concepts,
rather than metaphorical use of fiduciary terminology, indicates this
difficulty.
B. "Contracting Out."
Evaluating the concept of "contracting out" of fiduciary obligation
requires a similar analysis. The general notion (or metaphor) of "con-
tracting out" may embrace various types of provisions and actions, in-
cluding charter provisions that purport to vary fiduciary norms, and
agreements among individual shareholders that include language explic-
itly or implicitly waiving the parties' rights to remedies otherwise avail-
able to them, such as appraisal rights and the right to petition for
involuntary dissolution of the corporation. The following discussion will
focus on issues raised by charter provisions.
187. Compare Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983) (director in possession of nonpublic infor-
mation must disclose it or refrain from trading) with Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 111. 444, 450-
51, 74 N.E. 445, 447 (1905) (permitting director, in absence of "actual fraud," to purchase stock
from shareholder without disclosing information that the director may have concerning stock's
value) and Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 539-40, 90 N.W. 406, 410 (1902) (same). Later Illi-
nois cases modify the Hooker rule, following precedents from other states. See Agatucci v. Corradi,
327 Il1. App. 153, 157-58, 63 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1945) (officers purchasing shares must disclose special
circumstances affecting stock's value that are known to them and not ascertainable from corporate
books) (citing Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E.
659 (1933); Gammon v. Dain, 238 Mich. 30, 212 N.W. 957 (1927); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich.
504, 202 N.W. 955 (1925)). State law remains directly applicable, because the general antifraud
provision in the Securities Exchange Act, despite its breadth, applies only to transactions in securi-
ties listed on national securities exchanges or, for nonlisted securities, transactions making use of an
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails. State law is indirectly applicable as well, be-
cause the Court interprets section 10(b) to require disclosure only when a party has a duty to dis-
close. Cf Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-55 (no general duty to disclose before trading on material
nonpublic information); supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
188. See Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill. App. 134, 143-44, 108 N.E.2d
493, 497-98 (1952).
189. See Agatucci, 327 111. App. at 156, 158, 63 N.E.2d at 631-32. The court in Jordan, interest-
ingly, did not cite the Illinois caselaw.
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What significance should a court ascribe to provisions in a corpora-
tion's charter that alter the constraints otherwise applicable to a fiduci-
ary's dealings with the corporation? Prior cases considering the impact
of exculpatory clauses have declined to give effect either to provisions
shifting the burden of proof that the law would otherwise impose, 190 or
to provisions attempting to shield officers and directors from liability
arising from self-dealing transactions. 191 The judicial response to these
provisions suggests, once again, that the "contract" metaphor used in
Jordan is seriously misplaced. To the extent that recent amendments to
corporation statutes permit charter provisions reducing or eliminating
directors' liability, the statutory amendments preclude limiting or ex-
cluding liability when the director derives an improper personal
benefit. 192
Characterizing such provisions as the product of a "contracting"
process does not advance analysis. For example, if shareholders approve
such charter language, do they breach a contract with the corporation's
directors if they eliminate the provision through a subsequent amend-
ment? Occasionally, corporate law does effectively treat some aspects of
corporate bylaws or charters as "contractual" by requiring the consent of
all parties benefited by certain provisions in order to change them. Some
cases take this view of bylaw or charter provisions that embody restric-
tions on share transferability, even if the corporation's bylaws or charter
permit amendment of the provisions by vote of a mere majority of the
shares. 193 But the rhetoric (or metaphor) of "contracting out" does not
tell us how extensively the law of contracts applies to these provisions.
Nor does it tell us which of contract law's various aspects might be appli-
cable. Moreover, when shareholders approve an exculpatory provision,
it is unlikely that they foresee with any particularity the variety of cir-
cumstances and transactions to which the provision might apply.194 Giv-
ing literal effect to a broad exculpatory provision, then, seems
inconsistent with the situation-specificity of fiduciary obligation itself.
After all, one of fiduciary obligation's essential characteristics is its very
lack of an abstract essence that can be defined invariantly or indepen-
dently of particular contexts. 195
190. See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1968).
191. See Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972) ("Exculpatory
provisions of corporate articles create no license to steal."),
192, See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(iv) (Supp. 1986).
193. See Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 213, 79 A.2d 661, 663-64 (1951); Cowles
v. Cowles Realty Co., 201 A.D. 460, 466, 194 N.Y.S. 546, 551 (1922).
194. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 5.09 comment d(2) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987).
195. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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The caselaw determining the effect of exculpatory provisions is more
fully developed in the law of trusts. A provision in a trust instrument
cannot relieve a trustee of liability for any profit derived from a breach of
trust, and cannot relieve the trustee of liability for breaches of trust com-
mitted intentionally, in bad faith, or with reckless indifference to the in-
terests of the beneficiary. 196 An exculpatory provision is also ineffective
to the extent that its insertion in a trust instrument results from the
trustee's abuse of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with the
settlor.' 9
7
Courts' reluctance to be more indulgent of exculpatory provisions in
trust agreements is significant in the corporate context as well. Argua-
bly, the "contract" metaphor is more pertinent to a trust instrument,
because in the creation of a trust, true bargaining between the settlor and
the trustee is likely to occur.' 98 Except in closely held corporations, the
"bargain" that a corporation's charter represents between its sharehold-
ers and directors is more abstract: only rarely would shareholders know
its content and even more rarely would they negotiate with the directors
about that content. 99 In any event, although the "contract" metaphor
seems more plausible as applied to relationships created by a trust agree-
ment, trustees are severely limited in their ability to "contract out" of
liability for breaches of trust. In the corporate setting, where the analogy
between a trust instrument and a charter is often weak, an indulgent
reading of a broad exculpatory clause has even less to recommend it.
V. CONCLUSION
Fiduciary obligation has a number of characteristics that classify it
among the law's most exotic species. Its origin in Equity and its continu-
ing tie to Equity's legacy make it.unusually context-bound as a legal obli-
gation. The considerable variety of relationships in which parties are
bound by fiduciary obligation further complicates the analysis. Deter-
mining whether fiduciary obligation applies in a particular context and
what requirements inhere in the imposition of fiduciary obligation de-
mands recognition of this situation-specificity.
Although, as this Article demonstrates, careful analysis can resolve
many questions about fiduciary obligation, the difficulty of that under-
taking should not be underestimated. Shortcuts in legal reasoning
through metaphoric and unanalytic appeals to contract law serve only to
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(2) (1959).
197. See id. § 222(3).
198. See ALI, supra note 194, § 7.17 reporter's note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1988).
199. See id.
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muddle the analysis. Only a move from metaphor to analysis can resolve
these recurrent questions of fiduciary obligation.
